We, the Boomers

The international system is in crisis: it has entered a period of rapid change, the outcome of which is uncertain. The European Union is not in crisis, but it must adapt to an environment that is different from the one in which it was founded and grew.

We, the Boomers

The international system is in crisis: it has entered a period of rapid change, the outcome of which is uncertain. The European Union is not in crisis, but it must adapt to an environment that is different from the one in which it was founded and grew. It must also, and above all, reform itself to meet new challenges linked not only to its size but also to the expectations of its citizens and those who aspire to join it. The bar is set high, and there are many reasons to back down. But it is up to the generation that has supported this project and benefited from it to set this process in motion, using their experience not as an obstacle but as a guide for changes that should not be held back by any taboos. The ambition is no small one: to continue promoting a model of freedom, stability and prosperity.

From Bipolar Stability to Multipolar Fragmentation

The current multilateral system emerged from a world war which, between 1914 and 1945, led to the collapse of European hegemony. As a system of governance took shape, drawing lessons from the failure of the League of Nations by combining liberal ideals (the principle of equality governing the United Nations General Assembly) with the realism of power relations (the veto within the Security Council), a bipolar balance emerged, pitting two superpowers against one another, both basing their dominance in particular on their control of nuclear weapons. And yet neither was strictly speaking ready to play this role: Pearl Harbour for the United States and Operation Barbarossa for the Soviet Union were turning points.

From 1945 to 1989, the world was thus governed by the balance of a duopoly, which provided the backdrop for the emergence of European integration. This resulted in an exceptional period of stability, growth and prosperity in the shadow of benevolent American hegemony (the Marshall Plan and NATO) through a functional economic dynamic driven by the ideal of reconciling former adversaries and illustrated by the gradual transition from a customs union to a monetary union via the single market. But it never fell within the logic of the great powers: European integration was enabled by geopolitical conditions while simultaneously aspiring to transcend geopolitics.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was another turning point. This marked the beginning of the ‘end of history’, the globalisation of democracy and economic liberalism. It also opened a new space for a European Union, a new dynamic illustrated by the succession of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, and a ‘big bang’ enlargement that took place over 15 years, from 1989 to 2004.

At the same time, however, other developments were taking place in the open space created by the collapse of the condominium. Initially operating within the framework of the United Nations, the new states emerging from decolonization tried to break free from their former guardians. After several failed attempts to establish alternative blocs, regional powers that were once secondary were now seeing the possibility of playing a global role taking shape. The ‘happy globalization’ revealed its flaws through financial and health crises that proved difficult to control, whilst the supposed mechanisms of solidarity showed their limitations, particularly in the context of the fight against climate change. The international order was increasingly felt as ‘Western-centric’, even as the sole remaining potential hegemon appeared, regardless of the administration in power, to be guided primarily by its domestic interests. The emergence of the BRICS and the growing availability of new opportunities for transactional diplomacy for the Global South (from critical raw materials to return hubs) are consolidating this new shape of things

The world was changing and we, the boomers, reassured by the benevolent consensus surrounding the European project, perhaps didn’t see it coming.

The End of Western-Centric Order

Several scenarios could be envisaged, from the return of blocs to the reinvention of multilateralism. For sure, we are witnessing a competition between the United States and China, but neither currently appears to fit the logic of the ‘blocs’ seen during the second half of the 20^th century. And If multilateralism is to reinvent itself, it will be on a different basis from that of 1945. A balance will have to be struck between a new multipolarity and a reaffirmed logic of power. But the question will also be that of the necessity and nature of such institutionalization.

Having emerged from a specific historical context, the current institutional form of the European Union does not predispose it to fit into this new logic of power. Its narrative was initially one of reconciliation between former belligerents. Today, it is one of the reunification of the European continent, or at least part of it. Furthermore, the supposed universality of its values is now coming under fierce attack from resentment stemming from its imperialist past. A first task is therefore essential: to continue unwaveringly to build a model of economic, social and cultural integration, whilst accepting that this may not be seen as a universal benchmark.

But, more fundamentally, the question arises as to whether the European Union, in its current form, can adapt to this new international environment, whatever form it may take. The answer is probably no. This, however, raises a question: will this adaptation be the result of a deliberate process – even if empirical – or will it be the result of an improvised response to increasingly violent shocks?

The Institutional Impasse

Many observers are now advocating for a review of the Union’s governance. Behind this general call lie, in fact, quite different approaches.

Some focus on structures and methods and are reflected, for example, in the proposals for the new multiannual financial framework or in the mandate given to Commissioner Serafin to carry out a large-scale review of the Commission’s organization and operations. Concerns are also raised about the EU’s internal structure for external action, which should enable it to respond more effectively to the new and multiple geopolitical shocks.

Others put into question the range of actions undertaken, advocating a focus on genuine priorities, better coordination of initiatives to make policies more transparent, or a return to the principles of better regulation.

But any attempt to open a fundamental institutional debate invariably comes up against the argument that “there is no appetite for it”. Another argument put forward would be the new configuration of the European political landscape, linked to the emergence of actors championing national, or even patriotic, causes. The fear, then, would be that of a drastic redefinition of the project for an ‘ever closer Union’. A curious argument, which could be seen as a refusal to engage in a democratic debate “whatever it takes”.

And yet the table is set, and it is the table of enlargement.

The Enlargement Imperative and Differentiated Integration

The Union and the Member States can no longer maintain a model inherited from a community of six, at the risk of paralysis that could lead to implosion and an even deeper crisis with their immediate neighbours.  An “aggiornamento” will therefore be necessary, which could provide an opportunity for a more ambitious approach. In this context, Ukraine presents a particular challenge, as there are many reasons why accession could be (indefinitely?) delayed, building upon the dual criteria of the candidate’s merits and the Union’s capacity to absorb. However, conditions for a lasting peace remain, until proven otherwise, a major political objective which should result in an agreement that will include the terms of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU. The question will then be that of the Union’s offer and its acceptability to the parties concerned. Mr Putin’s Russia appears to have no problem with Ukraine joining the EU (in return for respecting the ‘red line’ on NATO), but would any form of altered, gradual or phased integration be acceptable to Ukraine?

However, whatever reservations there may be, the institutional debate is well and truly underway.

The political concepts put forward to give new impetus to enlargement (the Franco-German non-paper) or the catalogue of options for future accession treaties proposed by the Benelux memorandum, if supported, will need to be translated into legal arrangements, the format and vehicle for which remain to be determined.

One of the challenges will be not only to establish a new institutional balance where it appears necessary (as in the area of defence, for instance), but also to put in place management mechanisms that are sufficiently flexible to meet the growing need for flexibility, building upon bridging clauses, opt-outs and enhanced cooperation: rather than getting bogged down in a futile debate over unanimity and qualified majority voting, this could be the surest way to organize the recognition that not all ‘old’ and ‘future new’ Member States can or wish to move forward on all fronts. Appropriate institutional frameworks will need to be put in place if we are to make progress towards differentiated integration, beyond the scope permitted by the current provisions should they not enable the objectives to be achieved, for instance, to allow the ‘coalitions of the willing’ – which are being referred to with increasing frequency – to take shape within the context of the current institutional arrangements. Otherwise, there is a risk that new intergovernmental bureaucracies will emerge without any real democratic oversight (as was the case with Schengen before its incorporation into the Community “acquis”).

Under no circumstances should this be an exercise in legal technocracy. The outcome must consolidate, or even strengthen, the mechanisms ensuring the democratic accountability of the new institutional framework. Furthermore, the reform process must be designed to fully meet these criteria of transparency and accountability, lest it result in an outcome with weak legitimacy that is exposed to major risks during subsequent ratification processes. The Conference on the Future of Europe has not left only good memories, and there is not enough time to go through the phase of a convention modelled on the one that indirectly gave rise to the Treaty of Lisbon. An alternative could be an interinstitutional agreement also involving national parliaments, which could lead to a ‘light’ form of convention.

About possible next steps

Having affirmed during its Presidency its ambition for the future of the Union and able to draw on a long and remarkable history of institutional initiatives, Belgium could play a role in this context, either alone or in a coalition, for example within the Benelux. And the forthcoming 25th anniversary of the Laeken Declaration could bring back certain memories in this regard.

Some will say that this is announcing an “autumn of enlargement” and is a disproportionate effort for an uncertain outcome. A strategic debate on reforms and enlargement has been announced for the October European Council and, to kick things off, the Commissioner for Enlargement is sketching lines of action that should help reinvigorating European integration rather than weakening it. It would be futile to harbour overly high expectations regarding the immediate outcome of such a debate, but it might perhaps set in motion a process that would see decisionmakers break free from a path of dependency to offer future generations a model of integration that provides them with the same stability and prosperity that they themselves have enjoyed.

(Photo credit:  Wikimedia Commons)