Beyond Crisis Management: Next Generation EU and the Future of European Solidarity

The European Union has always advanced through crises, but each crisis has also exposed the ambiguities surrounding one of the Union’s founding principles: solidarity.

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Beyond Crisis Management: Next Generation EU and the Future of European Solidarity

The European Union has always advanced through crises, but each crisis has also exposed the ambiguities surrounding one of the Union’s founding principles: solidarity. Since the Schuman Declaration, solidarity has been portrayed as both the means and the ultimate objective of European integration, yet its practical application has often remained contingent upon political necessity rather than embedded in the Union’s institutional architecture.

The Covid-19 pandemic reopened this longstanding debate by prompting an unprecedented collective response through Next Generation EU (NGEU). More than a recovery instrument, NGEU raises a broader question about the future of European integration: does Next Generation EU represent a turning point in the evolution of European solidarity?

This question is particularly significant because solidarity has historically occupied an uncertain position within the European legal and political order. Although successive treaty reforms have progressively strengthened its normative relevance, the Treaties do not provide a comprehensive definition of its content or of the obligations it generates. Instead, solidarity has evolved through a combination of political practice, legislative developments and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As a result, it has gradually acquired multiple dimensions, extending beyond cooperation among Member States to encompass redistributive, economic and, more recently, intergenerational considerations.

Past Crises and the Evolution of EMU

The evolution of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) illustrates both the importance and the limitations of this principle. Monetary integration advanced rapidly through the creation of the Euro and the centralisation of monetary policy, while fiscal policy remained largely a national competence. This asymmetry became particularly evident during the sovereign debt crisis, when the absence of a genuine fiscal union constrained the range of policy options available to European institutions. Financial assistance was primarily organised through loans accompanied by strict macroeconomic conditionality and fiscal consolidation measures. Although these instruments contributed to preserving the stability of the Eurozone, they also reinforced political divisions between creditor and debtor countries and fuelled criticism that European integration had become associated with austerity rather than mutual support.

The Covid-19 pandemic confronted the Union with a fundamentally different challenge. Unlike the sovereign debt crisis, it was an exogenous shock affecting every Member State irrespective of domestic economic policies. In these circumstances, preserving the integrity of the Single Market required a coordinated European response that went beyond traditional financial assistance mechanisms and permitted institutional innovations that had previously seemed unattainable.

Within NGEU, two innovations are particularly significant. The first is the creation of common European debt. For the first time, the European Commission was empowered to raise substantial resources on international capital markets through debt guaranteed by the EU budget. Although conceived as a temporary measure, this decision marked a profound institutional innovation. It demonstrated that Member States were prepared to mutualise financial risks in response to a common challenge, partially overcoming one of the structural weaknesses that had characterised the architecture of EMU since its creation. The second innovation concerns the allocation of these resources. A substantial share of NGEU funding was distributed as grants rather than loans. This distinction is central to understanding the programme’s contribution to European solidarity. Grants constitute a tangible expression of redistributive solidarity by transferring financial resources to Member States most severely affected by the pandemic without increasing their national debt. As a result, the Recovery and Resilience Facility introduces a stronger redistributive component into European economic policy.

This transformation also reflects a broader evolution in the understanding of solidarity itself. The programme combines different forms of solidarity that had previously developed separately within the European project. Emergency solidarity remains evident in the rapid mobilisation of common resources to address an unprecedented crisis. Redistributive solidarity is expressed through financial transfers directed towards Member States facing greater economic vulnerability. At the same time, the programme introduces an element of competitive solidarity by linking financial support to reforms intended to strengthen the long-term performance of both national economies and the Union as a whole.

Responsibility Towards Future Generations

The significance of NGEU, however, cannot be assessed solely through its innovations in fiscal governance or its contribution to solidarity among Member States. The programme also introduces a less explored but equally important dimension of European solidarity: responsibility towards future generations. It is precisely here that the long-term legacy of NGEU will ultimately be determined. While the programme was designed to respond to the immediate consequences of the pandemic, its financing model inevitably projects its effects well beyond the current generation of European citizens.

Intergenerational solidarity broadens the traditional understanding of solidarity within the European Union. Rather than focusing exclusively on relations among Member States, it requires policymakers to consider the long-term consequences of present decisions for those who will inherit the European project. In this sense, solidarity is no longer confined to the horizontal redistribution of resources between countries but also encompasses a vertical responsibility towards future Europeans. The objective is not simply to overcome an immediate crisis, but to ensure that the measures adopted today strengthen, rather than weaken, the economic and institutional foundations on which future generations will depend.

This perspective is particularly relevant because NGEU is financed through common borrowing that will be repaid over several decades. Future generations will therefore bear part of the financial burden created to address the pandemic. Whether this represents an expression of solidarity or an unjustified transfer of costs depends on a fundamental condition: the investments financed today must generate durable economic and social benefits capable of compensating for the obligations assumed tomorrow.

From this perspective, public debt should not automatically be regarded as incompatible with intergenerational solidarity. Borrowing may be fully consistent with the interests of future generations if it finances investments that increase productivity, foster innovation and strengthen long-term economic growth. Under these circumstances, future citizens inherit not only debt but also more resilient economies, stronger institutions and greater opportunities. Conversely, if the resources mobilised through NGEU fail to produce lasting structural improvements, future taxpayers may ultimately bear the costs of decisions from which they derive only limited benefits.

Therefore, NGEU long-term success will depend on whether the programme effectively enhances the productive capacity of European economies and contributes to sustainable growth. Only under these conditions can common borrowing be regarded as a genuine instrument of intergenerational solidarity rather than merely an exceptional response to an extraordinary crisis.

Nevertheless, important uncertainties remain. The temporal gap between political decision-making and financial responsibility may weaken incentives for efficient investment, while short electoral cycles can conflict with the long-term benefits of education, innovation and infrastructure. Intergenerational solidarity therefore requires policies capable of prioritising future generations over immediate political incentives.

More broadly, NGEU has also reshaped the concept of conditionality. The conditionality attached to the Recovery and Resilience Facility differs fundamentally from the logic that characterised the sovereign debt crisis. Rather than focusing primarily on fiscal consolidation, it seeks to encourage reforms and investments consistent with common European objectives. In doing so, the European Commission has assumed a more prominent role in coordinating national policy priorities through financial incentives, reinforcing an emerging model of governance based on common funding and shared strategic objectives.

A Temporary Exception or a Permanent Shift?

Whether this model will become a permanent feature of European integration remains uncertain. NGEU was explicitly conceived as a temporary instrument responding to exceptional circumstances, and its institutional innovations have not fundamentally altered the constitutional architecture of the Union. The forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will therefore provide an important test of whether these new forms of solidarity can be incorporated into the ordinary framework of European governance. If the next financial framework strengthens redistributive investment, intergenerational responsibility and common strategic objectives, it could consolidate elements of the model introduced by NGEU. If, instead, these mechanisms remain exceptional and temporary, the programme may ultimately represent a significant but contained departure from the previous trajectory of European integration.

The question of resources will be equally important. A stronger role for solidarity within the Union’s regular financial architecture will depend not only on how expenditure is allocated, but also on how it is financed. The debate on common borrowing is therefore far from over. The experience of NGEU has demonstrated that common debt can be politically feasible under certain circumstances, while also raising questions about the development of new own resources capable of supporting the repayment of common borrowing and, potentially, future common investment.

The programme should therefore be understood less as the culmination of a process than as the opening of a new phase in the evolution of European integration. It has strengthened emergency and redistributive solidarity while introducing a more explicit concern for intergenerational responsibility. Whether these developments evolve into structural solidarity will depend on both the performance of NGEU investments and the choices made in the next MFF. Its ultimate legacy remains an open question, one whose answer will shape the future of European solidarity and the trajectory of European integration itself.

(Photo credit:  Anemone123, Pixabay)