India-EU Strategic Partnership, Still A Long Way To Go

The year 2026 started on a high note for EU-India relations. The January-27 agreements on the EU-India FTA, on the Security and Defence Partnership, and on Mobility signalled a deepening of the existing strategic partnership between India and the EU.

India-EU Strategic Partnership, Still A Long Way To Go

The year 2026 started on a high note for EU-India relations. The January-27 agreements on the EU-India FTA, on the Security and Defence Partnership, and on Mobility signalled a deepening of the existing strategic partnership between India and the EU. This December, almost one year later, Prime Minister is expected in Brussels for the formal signing of the FTA.

So how has this relationship, after many globally eventful months, evolved? To what degree have the expressed hopes for a deeper relationship been fulfilled as of now? What can be expected, or should be hoped for, in terms of possible deliverables as outcomes for the December meeting?

Geopolitical Distractions and High Diplomatic Traffic

Soon after the successful EU-India meeting of 27th January, the attention of Delhi and Brussels became focused on the Iran war and its consequences. Meanwhile, Washington’s rather disruptive policies kept the minds of capitals worldwide occupied. Diplomatic and political energies of both capitals had to be directed at pressing geo-political and -economic matters.

Furthermore, India became busy with its BRICS-chairmanship. High level bilateral visits between Moscow and Delhi have continued to take place on regular intervals. Modi and Putin met twice, in the margins of the SCO-summit and, more recently, during the BRICS-summit in Delhi.

The Indian Prime Minister had two encounters with Chinese leader XI. High level talks have continued to take place between India and China, mainly to try to restore a bilateral relationship that was severely disrupted after the 2020 Galwan (Ladakh) incident, a violent and deadly clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers at the so-called Line of Actual Control.

Likewise, the EU’s political energies were and are being spent on internal discussions regarding issues such as its policy vis-à-vis Israel. The war in Ukraine remains a continuous challenge and burden for the EU. Difficult negotiations are under the way about the next multi-year budget of the Union. Furthermore, several EU Member States were, and still are, confronted with serious domestic issues, as was and is India.

The question that arises in this context is: has the promised deepening of the strategic partnership led to any results as yet?

No doubt a lot of bilateral activity has taken place between the two sides since 27th January.

Prime Minister Modi visited several EU-Member States (the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, France and Slovakia) and non-EU-member Norway.

Prior to the EU-India Summit, German Chancellor Merz went to Delhi. President Macron of France visited India in February, as did Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez and his Finnish colleague Orpo that same month, while Belgian Prime Minister De Wever went to India on an official visit in September. Some of these bilateral meetings resulted in the conclusion of Strategic Partnerships between India and certain Member States. Alongside these national visits, a meeting took place in the margins of the G7 in Evian on 17th June between Prime Minister Modi, European Council President Costa, and Commission President Von der Leyen. Foreign Minister Jaishankar and EU High Representative Kallas also met several times in 2026, including at the EU Foreign Affairs Council in March, Gymnich in May, and the TTC in July. More

importantly, from an institutional perspective, the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council took place in Brussels on 15th July.

The Strategic Deficit: A Lack of Geopolitical Synergy

The question is however whether these diverse interactions can be qualified as being part of a ‘deepening’ of the EU-India strategic partnership. There is no doubt that the frequent visits of Foreign Minister Jaishankar to Brussels have established a more regular political interaction between the EU and India.

Notwithstanding the many meetings that took place over these last month’s however, there is still a lack of focused political Interaction between the EU and India after the January-Summit.

It is not a coincidence that Foreign Affairs-specialists and -commentators in India, when talking about Delhi’s options in a rapidly changing, confusing international context, hardly ever mention the EU, if at all. It is all about Washington, Beijing and Moscow. The relationship with the US is considered to be by far (and rightly so – the same applies to the EU), of the highest importance to India, while China is its greatest threat and Russia its traditional ‘friend’. The EU is neither of these for India. It is seen as a friendly, useful and promising economic partner but not as an actor capable of helping India, let alone itself, in tackling the problems created by the new geopolitical disorder.

One would expect strategic partners to intensify their cooperation on geopolitical problems that impact the interests of both sides.

The Iran war, which started on 28th February 2026, is a good example of why the EU-India relationship still has a long way to go to. This conflict overtook the global agenda. It has a serious impact on stability within the Middle East and on energy supplies worldwide. The Middle East, or West Asia as it is called in Delhi, connects India with Europe. It is an essential geographic reality between them, through which passes most of their bilateral trade. However, neither the EU nor India have tried to play a significant role in trying to end this war, be it alone or together.

Or take the Ukraine war. While the end to this war would be a big relief for Europe, it would benefit India greatly too. No longer would the latter’s relationship with Moscow complicate its interactions with the EU to the same degree. It would also simplify Delhi’s relations with Washington. Recently India has come up with proposals aimed at stopping the conflict. But it does not seem to have consulted about this with its EU counterparts.

The conclusion one must draw from all this is that the EU and India still have a long way to go in order to see each other as real strategic partners.

Operationalising the Partnership: Indo-Pacific and Defence

As a useful way of strengthening the geopolitical aspect of the relationship, India and the EU should start a serious effort in the Indo-Pacific, i.e. by including Canada and Japan, in the discussion. The SDP proposes such an initiative (“3.3.3 Launch EU-India Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and explore cooperation through projects in third countries”). The EU has to become more credible in the Indo-Pacific context. This is all the more important as the US has reduced its interest for the region – in exchange for its bilateral dealings with China.

The defence industrial sector presents another promising domain. As a result of the signing of the SDP, the subject of cooperation in the defence industry has received a lot of attention. The

potential in this field is undoubtedly very big. The text that was agreed upon, however, remains very careful. Under the heading of ‘Defence Industrial Cooperation’ (para 3.2), the terms ‘consult’, ‘exchanges’ and ‘explore’ are used as ways of encouraging cooperation in this field. In the same passage the setting up of an EU-India Defence Industrial Forum is proposed. But it should be industry-led. While useful as a way of introducing this subject within the ambit of EU-India cooperation, these can hardly be called concrete steps. Defence-industrial actors from different EU-member states have, over recent years, increased their activities with and in India. Bilateral cooperation in this field between India and several European nations has been flourishing. At this point in time, however, it is impossible to see how the EU-India cooperation in this field will take shape. The upcoming December summit presents an ideal opportunity to come up with solutions will that operationalize the envisaged defence-industrial cooperation between India and the EU.

Several instruments for EU-India cooperation have existed since quite some time. Others were concluded last January: the FTA, the Security and Defence Partnership, the Mobility pact, and the revised strategic agenda (Joint India–EU Comprehensive Strategic Agenda for 2030), which aims “to further reinforce the strategic partnership by broadening and deepening India-EU cooperation, to deliver mutually beneficial, concrete and transformative outcomes for both partners and for the wider world.” All of them together, if implemented properly, could eventually lead to a stronger relationship

Important elements that are still missing are the agreements on investment-protection and on the protection of information. Both would greatly enhance the levels of trust between India and the EU.

Sustaining Momentum for the December Summit

After having been rather neglected by Brussels for several years, the EU-India relationship has seen an upward trend that started in 2022, with the visit of Commission President Von der Leyen to Delhi. This eventually culminated in the EU-India-summit of January 2026, which saw the adoption of some important decisions. Of late however, due to a number of factors, it seems that the engine has lost some of its steam. It is important that the positive movement we saw over the last four years should not be lost.

Events around the world have shown us that it is easy for countries and other actors to get lost in the complexities of the geopolitical uncertainties of the moment. Nevertheless, meaningful interaction on important geopolitical issues is central for a Partnership if it is to become really strategic.

The EU and India have not reached this stage as yet. For the benefit of the Strategic Partnership and its credibility, it is important that the security and political dialogue, on the highest level, between Brussels and Delhi be strengthened further. Common interests related to the situation in Ukraine, in the IOR, the Indo-Pacific, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea should be discussed on a regular basis with the aim of coming up with proposals and solutions that are beneficial to both sides. Furthermore, the cooperation in the defence industrial domain has to become more tangible. What is not clear, at this point in time, is whether nor how the implementation of SDP, the Mobility Pact and the Strategic Agenda have been planned. Hopefully the December summit will produce some deliverables in his regard.

The visit of Prime Minister Modi, in December, to Brussels, would provide an excellent opportunity for the EU and India to progress further in the positive way we have seen in the recent past.

(Photo credit:  Canva Teams)