The “Tigres,” Katanga and the DRC War
In
On 24 January 2025, a group of Katangese “Tigres” were deported from Luanda to Kinshasa and handed over to the DRC military intelligence service DEMIAP. Nothing has been heard of them since.
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The “Tigres,” Katanga and the DRC War
On 24 January 2025, a group of Katangese “Tigres” were deported from Luanda to Kinshasa and handed over to the DRC military intelligence service DEMIAP. Nothing has been heard of them since. A few days later, a message was circulating on WhatsApp saying that Lt. Col. Mulaja Mushitu, one of them, had been executed and four others passed away. What is all this about? It sheds some light on the complex role of Katanga in the ongoing M23 war.
The “Tigres” have a long history. Former army units of Moise Tshombe’s independent Katanga, with addition from new recruits, fled the Mobutu regime in 1967 to join the Portuguese colonial authorities in Angola. When they were trained as commando units by Portuguese officers, they were called “Tigres.” In December 1974, ten months before independence, they concluded an agreement with the MPLA for mutual military support. The “Tigres,” known as an efficient fighting force, assisted the MPLA in their takeover of power at independence; the MPLA allowed them to stage two attacks against the Mobutu regime in 1977 and 1978. When these operations failed, they were demobilized after their return to Angola and became refugees. In 1987-88, however, they were re-armed in the MPLA war against Unita which spread all over the country after Unita leader Savimbi’s refusal to accept the result of the 1992 elections. To this end, the “tigres” were integrated in the “24th regiment” of the Angolan government army FAA, created in 1993 and disbanded in 2001. The 4 April 2002 peace treaty between the MPLA and UNITA put an end to the Angolan civil war and the “tigres” were again demobilized. The many battles fought for the MPLA entitled the “Tigres” to some form of reward for their struggle.
The bulk of this military force headed for the DRC to support the 1996-97 war which toppled Mobutu. During the following years, sections of the remaining “Tigres” in Angola were sent back to the DRC but others remained in the country. All over these years, several generations of “Tigres” followed each other and new recruits crossed the Angolan border, not all of whom were Katangese. Still, only approx. 700 military became registered members of the Angolan army FAA, the others remaining in an unclear status as being not really Angolans and no longer Congolese. Many must survive with occasional jobs, petty trade, agriculture, and diamond digging in the Lunda Norte province.
Since their entry into Angolan territory, the “Tigres,” whose politico-military organization was called FLNC or “Congolese National Liberation Front” have been a bone of contention between the Angolan and Congolese authorities. For the Congolese, the presence of a military force – not just a simple armed group – just across the Angolan border was a potential threat. For the Angolans, to keep the “tigres” in an uncertain and always provisional status made them a possible instrument for mobilization, provided they were kept under tight control.
In Katanga, the “Tigres” were not seen as a threat but as a force. In DRC’s Katanga provinces, many families (most of all, but not exclusively, Lunda) supported the “Tigres” with recruits, money, or information. The family ties created a close bond between the Lunda, Sanga etc. in Katanga and the “Tigres” in Angola. They became a symbol for Katangese independence, and anyone fighting for Katanga adopted their name even if no real ties existed. This created tensions with the DRC authorities, from the Mobutu regime until today. Under the Tshisekedi regime, the political tension in Katanga with the government is compounded by a community conflict between Katangese and natives from Kasai.
During the 1991-1994 period, natives from Kasai were massively expelled from Katanga and Katangese took their jobs, albeit during an economic breakdown in the province. The coming to power of Tshisekedi and his UDPS party, who have most of their constituency in the Kasai provinces, saw an equally massive and organized return of natives from the impoverished Kasai provinces back to the relatively better off Katanga. Political and military nominations were clearly to the advantage of Tshisekedi’s community of origin, creating serious tension in Katanga. UDPS militia and networks of the local motorcycle transport drivers exerted violence against the Katangese and in the border post Kasumbalesa they even control a parallel and informal customs border post. Arbitrary killings and insecurity in the urban areas contribute importantly to the climate of tension. Machetes and even firearms reportedly were recently distributed to UDPS militia, creating potential for violent confrontation. For many Katangese, the priority is now to replace the current president, if necessary, even with the return to power of the previously despised Joseph Kabila or with a takeover of Katanga and Kinshasa by Corneille Nangaa’s M23.
This caused the current regime to intensify repression against Katangese military and political figures reputed to be close to Joseph Kabila. According to witnesses, most detainees in the military prison of Ndolo in Kinshasa are from Katanga and/or from East Congo. Among these are former “Tigres” as General Philemon Yav, the nephew of former FLNC leader Nathanaël Mbumba. Members of the Tshombe family, such as David Tshombe, candidate governor of Lualaba province in 2023 and grandson of the Lunda Chief Mwant Yav Muteb II who founded the FLNC, were forced to go in exile.
The “Tigres” in Angola were thus again perceived by Kinshasa as a potential threat. In 2022 General John Tshibangu, close confident of president Tshisekedi, went to Angola to request the return of the “tigres” but the Angolan authorities replied that they were Angolans and could stay in the country. However, in 2021 Lt. Col. Mulaja Mushitu, commander of approx. 3200 former “tigres” in Txamba (Dundo, Lunda Norte) went to Zimbabwe upon request from John Numbi, the military right hand of Kabila in view of an alliance. Recently, this was an argument for the Angolans to deport all members of the headquarters of this brigade to Luanda and then to Kinshasa where Mulaja reportedly was executed. With this group were other Tigres and a so-called ‘Front for the Liberation of Katanga” (FLNK) created in 2023 under Cosmas Muteb. Since their transfer to Kinshasa where they were probably handed over to the military intelligence Demiap, nothing has been heard of the group. In the meantime, the Angolans called all former “Tigres” to come forward for identification and, maybe, for returning them to the DRC. This created important discontent with military units who contributed significantly to the military victory of the MPLA and who consider that they were never properly rewarded for their efforts and the deaths of their colleagues. If this is correct, then the attitude of President Lourenço towards the “Tigres”, totally complying with the requests from Kinshasa, leaves the path followed by his predecessor Dos Santos, who was fully aware of the Tigres’ history and contribution, despite official denials by the “communist” MPLA about any cooperation with the “tshombist” Tigres. It must be underlined that the historical leader of the FLNC, Nathanael Mbumba, who passed away in Luanda in 2016, was buried with official honors in the Benfica cemetery in an area reserved for senior FAA government army officers.
It is currently unclear whether the M23 supported by Rwandan military forces will progress towards Kalemie and Lubumbashi, as international pressure from the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA and even the European Union is increasing. If many Katangese are sympathetic to the M23 because they want a regime change, not because they have a peculiar sympathy for AFC leader Nangaa, there is no visible leadership and the “Tigres” are unlikely to interfere. But the Tshisekedi regime has spared no effort to intensify the antagonism between Kasai and Katangese communities, which is now an important problem to resolve in the national and international political and security balance.
(Photo credit: Erik Kennes)