Towards a Credible EU-India Strategic Partnership?

The outcomes of the most recent EU-India summit, the 16^th of its kind, on January 27^th 2026, were significant in many regards. They signal that the relations between Brussels and New Delhi has matured into a much broader partnership.

*******

Towards a Credible EU-India Strategic Partnership?

The outcomes of the most recent EU-India summit, the 16^th of its kind, on January 27^th, 2026, were significant in many regards. They signal that the relations between Brussels and New Delhi has matured into a much broader partnership.

Having reached this new level of bilateral understanding, the question now is:

• how will the EU handle the expectations it has created by its own messaging regarding the outcomes of the Summit? More specifically, how can the EU as a strategic partner of India, establish credibility in the field of defence and security? The role of the EU-member states being of central importance in these fields, how much space will the Member States allow the EU to take?

Looking back at the recent history of EU-India relations one notices that the Union has had a high level of political ambition for many years. Already more than 20 years ago, at the Fifth EU-India Summit in The Hague (8^th November 2004) it was decided to upgrade the India-EU relationship to the level of a ‘Strategic Partnership’.  The reason given at the time was that India-EU interaction had grown from a purely trade and economy driven relationship, to one covering a very broad range of areas. The use of the term ‘Strategic’ thereby referred in the first place to the broad and expanding nature of the relations. The next Summit, in 2005, adopted a ‘Joint Action Plan’ covering a multitude of domains in which the EU and India would aim to work together. Some new areas of cooperation were added to the Action Plan in 2008 (Marseille, 9^th Summit). In Brussels, at the 13th Summit, a ‘EU-India Agenda for Action’ was decided upon. The 15^th Summit saw the adoption of the 2020-2025 Roadmap (“India-EU Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025”). The FTA, the Security and Defence Partnership and the new Comprehensive Strategic Agenda agreed upon last January, are the culmination of this evolution.

An incremental but continuous growth of areas for ‘strategic’ consultation and/or common action, happened between 2005 and 2020. It then took a rather long time, almost 6 years, for the EU and India to meet again at the highest level. In that period of time a lot happened in the world. Brexit, Trump I, the Indian-Chinese Galwan (Ladakh) incident, Covid, Ukraine, Trump II, Gaza, these were all factors that shook the EU, India, and the world at large. It seems that these momentous events contributed to a ‘ripening’ of Indo-EU relations, leading to January 27^th agreements.

The relationship between the Union and India as it is now, is by definition based upon the common political ambition of the 27 Member States. Next to the EU however, several EU member states too have an ‘overall’ strategic Partnership, including ‘action agenda’s’, with India: France (1998), Germany (2000), Italy (2023), Poland (2024), Greece (2023), while some have ‘sectoral’ Strategic Partnerships with New Delhi: a ‘Water Strategic Partnership’ with the Netherlands (2021), a ‘Green Strategic Partnership’ with Denmark (2020), a ‘Strategic Partnership in Digitalization and Sustainability’ with Finland (2026). Others, such as Spain, have extensive bilateral defence agreements with Delhi. Will these countries now give the EU the necessary tools to credibly implement the Security and Defence parts of the partnership with India?

The EU-India Strategic partnership of 2004 hardly dealt with security and defence matters. Its main focus was on trade and economic areas. This is not surprising as for most EU-countries the primary focus of their relationship with India lay in the field of trade and economics. India, considering its size and population, was seen first and foremost as a potentially interesting market.

The 1998 Strategic Partnership with France however was all about security and defence. It was also the first strategic relationship India ever went into. It came about at a difficult time for India, not long after India’s nuclear tests (Pokhran-II nuclear tests, 11-13 May 1998). The strategic meaning of this Partnership lay to a large degree in France’s recognition of India’s right to have nuclear weapons. It was an expression for both partners of strategic autonomy. Defence-industrial cooperation was another very important element of the agreement.

The January 27^th Summit has thus, through the EU-India Security and Defence Partnership, brought the EU and India closer to the spirit of the 1998 Indo-French agreement. But while the relationship between France and India in this area is strong, the EU is only at the beginning of its security-and-defence-journey with India.

Notwithstanding the newly minted position of Commissioner for Defence and Space, the European Commission, except for defence industry, has no competence in the field of security and defence. It depends fully upon the consensus amongst the Member States as to what it can do in this field. The EU has but limited defence-structures of its own. Military security policy remains for the most part a national and/or transatlantic matter. The European defence industry is marked by stiff competition between the member-states. The Commission is trying to create the basis for more cooperation, but concrete results are as yet limited. Then again, the Indian defence-market is huge. Intra-EU competition should be unlikely, but it cannot be excluded.

And as the Iran-war has shown once again, disagreements between the Member States block it from acting or reacting in a decisive way in moments of geopolitical crisis.

In her speech to the External Action Service Ambassadors on March 9^th Commission-President Von De Leyen points to the challenges the EU is confronted with to become a credible geopolitical actor:

“We urgently need to reflect on whether our doctrine, our institutions and our decision making – all designed in a postwar world of stability and multilateralism – have kept pace with the speed of change around us. Whether the system that we built – with all of its well-intentioned attempts at consensus and compromise – is more a help or a hindrance to our credibility as a geopolitical actor.”

The EU-India Strategic Partnership that has emerged from the January 27^th summit provides the Union with a perfect platform to work upon for a more coherent European defence and security posture. The implementation of the third Chapter of the Strategic Agenda (‘Towards 2030’ – 3. Security and Defence) can obviously not wait for the Member States to solve the structural weaknesses inherent in the existing decision-making procedures of the Union’s foreign and defence policies. The different platforms for EU-India security-consultations as proposed in the agenda, can possibly help the Union to better define its own positions.

However, concrete steps could and should be made in the field of ‘Defence Industrial Cooperation’. The India EU Defence Industry Forum should be set up as soon as possible. The start and successful conclusion of negotiations on a ‘Security of Information Agreement’ between the EU and India is another very important step that can be taken in the near future. Taking up these two points would be proof of the seriousness of this Strategic Relationship.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)