What does Rwanda want in the DRC?

The latest report from the UN Group of Experts  documents an important level of engagement from Rwanda in the ongoing conflict in East-Congo, which has been going on for 2.5 years and brought about 7.2 million IDPs and thousands of casualties.

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What does Rwanda want in the DRC?

The latest report from the UN Group of Experts  documents an important level of engagement from Rwanda in the ongoing conflict in East-Congo, which has been going on for 2.5 years and brought about 7.2 million IDPs and thousands of casualties. Official statements from Rwanda frame the deployment of troops to the DRC as a response to alleged genocidal threats against the DRC Tutsi community. Yet, it is hardly credible that a small land-locked country sends up to 4,000 of its troops – approximately one sixth of its military – to fight threats which according to the government, have been there for 30 years. So, what does Rwanda want to achieve through its expansive military support for the M23/AFC movement, despite regional and international criticism? If we want to try to understand what Rwanda wants, we must examine their overall strategy in Central Africa.

The Norwegian political scientist Frank Aarebrot predicted in 1990 that the wave of “democratization” in Africa would be followed by the emergence of African Bismarck figures. If there is one qualifying president in Africa, it is Paul Kagame, who 30 years after taking power, managed to maintain it with over 99% of the votes in the recent totally controlled elections. He crafted a long-term combined military-economic strategy to “make Rwanda great again”. An internally ruthless dictatorship extending to opponents abroad, ensures the type of stability that is accepted and encouraged by external economic actors. Cooperation agreements concluded with the Rwandan authorities are thoroughly negotiated but once a deal is concluded, it is correctly implemented.

Rwanda portrays itself as an island of stability with an investment-friendly business climate amidst a regional environment of chaos. It nurtures the ambition to become a regional hub for value-adding transformation of mineral resources.  Important quantities of tantalum and gold, mostly coming from the DRC, are exported by Rwanda without these bearing the label of “conflict minerals”, which is suitable for buyers. Rwanda’s ambitions reach even to Congo Brazzaville where an area the size of Hong Kong was given to Rwanda for agricultural exploitation – which is met by suspicion in Kinshasa.

The second main asset of the country is the efficiency of its army. The Rwanda Defense Forces have become an important instrument for the implementation of aspects of UN, USA and EU policy in the region, including the struggle against Islamist movements in the region of Cabo Delgado in Moçambique, or the delivery of troops for UN missions in CAR and South-Sudan. The various theaters where Rwandan troops are deployed are interconnected and serve the regional projection of power of the country. At the same time their deployment shields the leader of Rwanda against antagonism and creates regime cohesion, hence the conflict in the DRC is a structural necessity.

Thanks to this combined military and economic strategy, Rwanda has seen important levels of economic growth and development in the cities, despite criticism about the accuracy of the official economic statistics. President Kagame cleverly uses his country’s assets to deploy a coherent diplomacy and to befriend the most important leaders in the West.

The extent and duration of Rwanda’s support for the M23 movement in East Congo, which very likely means that the ongoing conflict is part of Rwanda’s long-term strategy and not a short-term operation to eliminate the “FDLR threat”. Whether by military means or by negotiations, Kagame will aim at realizing all or part of his strategic objectives. However, nobody knows for sure what these objectives are, and it remains a – very important – matter of conjecture A reasonable guess, consistent with previous Rwandan operations in East-Congo is territorial control of a buffer zone in East Congo, in order to consolidate their influence and extend their area of stability. This is consistent with their security policy, i.e. to protect the low strategic depth of the country (the distance between the DRC border and Kigali is no more than 150 km), but also with their economic policy, in this matter centered around agriculture (access to land) and mineral resources. It is a view shared by Rwanda-focused academics and policy makers.

Even if Rwanda’s economic operators could buy smuggled gold and coltan from the DRC without problem before, the war has opened up a direct access. According to the 2022-2023 National Bank of Rwanda annual report gold accounted for 34% of Rwandan exports. Interestingly, as Rwanda does not have any gold mines could this be considered merely as a re-export of gold? According to US Geological Survey statistics, Rwandan coltan increased with 49,8% from 2022 to 2023. The latest UN GoE report details a direct supply line from the coltan-rich Rubaya mine to Rwanda.

There are indicators that permanent control of a buffer zone in East Congo may be part of Rwanda’s strategic objectives: its massive and long-term engagement with an estimated 3,500 to 4,000 troops, sophisticated weaponry including GPS-jammers and anti-aircraft systems, the appointment of a parallel administration, and the deliberate burning of chiefdom archives in several localities seem to indicate this. It is also coherent with Rwanda’s regional strategy. If this is correct, and taking into account the supportive role played by Uganda, this could stabilize Rwanda but not the region.

Could Rwanda occupy a buffer zone in the East of the DRC?

Rwanda’s military operations have increasingly come under pressure. After a surprisingly weak reaction in the past from donors and governments about the occupation of DRC territory by Rwanda – one of the most serious violations of international law – western countries currently seem to harden their position, an evolution which will be reinforced by the changes in government in France and the United Kingdom, who previously were among Rwanda’s staunches supporters. A new round of sanctions will very likely be taken by the European Union, the USA and the UN, this time against higher level officers of the Rwanda Defense Forces active in East Congo. Renewed funding for the RDF operation in Moçambique by the European Union (which de facto liberates Rwandan funds for the DRC operation) was blocked because some countries made it conditional on withdrawal from the DRC while Belgium refused to grant funding. Unfortunately, no measures seem to be in sight similar to 2012 when aid to Rwanda were cut and the M23 consequently was forced by Kagame to leave the city of Goma which they occupied.

In spite of increased pressure on Rwanda, agreements of an economic nature continue to be signed, regardless of the war in the DRC. In February 2024, an MoU on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw material value chains was signed between the European Union and Rwanda partly concerning minerals smuggled from the DRC. Even if the framework agreement mentions measures of control for transparency, Rwanda reportedly has already refused any such controls during the ongoing negotiations about the final agreement.

This very ill-conceived and untimely MoU exemplifies a technocratic policy from the European Commission which does not consider the political environment. The EU critical minerals act isolates the scramble for critical minerals from all other considerations. The cabinet of the High Representative of the European Union, which should consider the sensitive political context, reportedly  has a pro-Kigali bias.

The new post-election political configuration in several EU member states and at the level of the foreign representative of the EU (prime minister Kaja Kallas) may possibly increase pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC. If this happens, the only alternative for Rwanda to realize its strategic objectives is through negotiations. Previous agreements with Rwanda-backed rebel movements in the East saw the integration of their officers in the military structures in the East and created important leverage for Kigali, something the DRC president now wants to avoid. The DRC, despite its failure to halt the M23/AFC, still bets on military reinforcement, but even if it starts to negotiate, the country is not sure to avoid a humiliating defeat. The structural weakness of the DRC military forces, the absence of any effective state administration in East Congo, the internal problems President Tshisekedi confronts with his own divided UDPS party and political competitors within his own coalition, very much weakens the DRC’s negotiation position. It will be difficult for the DRC to resist Rwanda’s demands for control and influence in the East without strong international support, mainly from the European Union and the USA but also from Angola. Yet, it seems unlikely that the US will be able to take a major initiative before the new administration is appointed; and it may take time before a new EU policy takes shape. The lynchpin for  the EU strategy for the Great Lakes is the appointment of a EU special envoy, and  Kagame was able, through his influence in France and the European Union, to block the appointment of the Belgian candidate. The DRCongo has considerably weakened the UN influence by asking Monusco to accelerate its departure, which ultimately might weaken its own position in the region. This makes the Angolan initiatives as African Union designated mediator all the more important and necessary.

All in all, it is urgent to try and identify Rwanda’s long-term strategy in Central Africa. Instead of opportunistically trying to harmonize EU and the Rwandan strategy and turn a blind eye to the tragedy in East Congo, the long-term consequences of this strategy must be assessed and balanced against the imperative of longer-term stability in the region. If the European Union cautions this evolution in the name of short-term objectives around mineral resources, it will inevitably be perceived as a Union respecting international law only if it suits their own interests.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)