Trump’s Europe Policy: No longer Different from Russia and China?

The US and Europe are allies, or that is what the Europeans still wish to believe. That does not mean that they are not economic competitors at the same time, or that they do not disagree on specific points of foreign policy.

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(Photo caption: “Guarding the border, in Belgium in 1940 – in Ukraine today?”)

Trump’s Europe Policy: No longer Different from Russia and China?

The US and Europe are allies, or that is what the Europeans still wish to believe. That does not mean that they are not economic competitors at the same time, or that they do not disagree on specific points of foreign policy. But they know that, when push comes to shove, they are on the same side. Ultimately, therefore, they always seek to preserve unity, as an objective in its own right, defying Lord Palmerston (who famously said that one has no eternal friends, or enemies, only eternal interests).

The second Trump administration seems to want to prove Palmerston right, however. For them, the European allies deserve no special consideration. One involves them, or not, or coerces them, as befits the US interest. If on a given issue a deal can be made with Russia without or even against the Europeans, so be it. If this becomes fixed US policy, it seriously affects the balance of power. No longer must Russia, China, and everybody else take into account that on all vital issues, the Atlantic alliance will stand together. Other powers may even begin to doubt whether the US will stand by its European allies in times of war; Trump has already undermined deterrence and thus the security of Europe.

What must Europe do?

At the Table or Not: Firm on Russia and Ukraine

Grovelling is not the answer: Trump assumes that is how he should be approached anyway, so it will bring no enduring rewards. Instead, Europe must assert itself, first of all on Ukraine. The US has created faits accomplis: it has started to negotiate with Russia, without inviting Europe; it will not allow Ukraine into NATO; it will not contribute troops to a security guarantee for Ukraine, nor will it allow NATO to be involved. Washington appears to aim at normalising relations with Moscow, and to be quite willing to make concessions on Ukraine to that end, without actually acting on behalf of Ukraine.

Europe, in concertation with Ukraine, can create faits accomplis too and shape the negotiations, even if it does not sit at the table. Trump cannot negotiate away European sanctions against Russia: the EU can state right now that it will maintain them, and set its own conditions for phasing them out. Of course, a stable and if possible good-neighbourly relationship with Russia is the desired end-state, but Europe cannot be forced to open its arms as long as Russia does not prove it can be trusted. Therefore, a European coalition can decide now that it will deploy an army corps in Ukraine to guarantee its security, whether Russia likes it or not. Most importantly, the EU must confirm that it will pursue Ukraine’s accession.

But: all of this is extremely urgent. If Europe wants to have an impact, its position must be clear before the next Russia-US meeting.

Whether Washington Likes it or Not: Involving NATO

Secretary of Defence Hegseth called on Europe to take ownership of its own conventional defence. That is entirely logical: NATO is an alliance, not a protectorate, and allies first of all defend themselves. Europe should have assumed this a long time ago; it must do it now – and confront the US with the implications of its own desires.

Obviously, the European allies must now themselves acquire those capabilities that until now only the US contributed to NATO. The aim is a complete conventional force package, that gives Europe military autonomy: it can be fully operational, and deter or defend against any conventional threat, without any US assets, while remaining under the US nuclear umbrella. This also requires, however, that Europe can make full use of the NATO command structure to plan for and conduct operations, for territorial defence, but also to address crises in Europe’s periphery.

That includes the European deployment in Ukraine to guarantee its security. Perhaps the British or French national headquarters could conduct that corps-sized operation. But one must also plan for war: if Russia invades Ukraine a third time anyway, which follow-on forces will be moved into Ukraine? And: which operations, defensive and offensive, will be planned in the other sectors of the Eastern flank? For one cannot isolate the Ukrainian theatre from the rest of the line: if war flares up again in Ukraine and a European coalition joins the fight, there will be fighting on other borders as well.

In other words, whatever the US says today: if a European coalition guarantees the security of Ukraine, NATO will be involved, because those Europeans will be NATO allies. So, if Europe deploys to Ukraine and Putin calls its bluff and attacks, Europe should call Trump’s bluff. If the US then does not join in alongside its European allies, it kills NATO.

Would Trump actually care? Hegseth stated that the US remains committed to NATO, but was that sincere or to sweeten the pill, and is that Trump’s view? One presumes that Trump does care about the economy. But does he understand that because the EU is a single market, war against any EU Member State means that all Member States will be in a war economy? The real danger is that Trump remains actively anti-EU, but splitting the EU equals chaos, to the immediate detriment of the most important economic link in the world: the Transatlantic bond.

Whether Beijing Likes it or Not: Involving China

Meanwhile, there has mostly been radio silence from China. China has gained quit a bit from this war – at the expense of Russia, from which it has exacted major economic concessions, though these have reached a ceiling now. China has also lost: most European leaders trust China even less now, and many see a change of position on Ukraine as a precondition for agreements in other areas. Because what Beijing purports is a neutral stance, Brussels mostly sees as support for Russia. China has also lost influence in North Korea, and fears that Russia is providing it with weapons and technology that risk destabilising the Korean peninsula (though its official silence on the issue means that again it creates the perception that it condones if not supports the deployment of North Koreans troops in Russia). It is in China’s interest now, therefore, to end the war.

That Russia may not make a deal with the US without involving China, likely rankles in Beijing. If Russia and the US normalise relations, Moscow will be in a much stronger position vis-à-vis Beijing again, and the US free to concentrate on Asia. Why then did China incur all that reputational damage on Russia’s behalf? Or have China and Russia already made an agreement behind the scenes that whatever Trump hopes, they will stick together and not allow the US to play them off against each other (as Nixon played China against the Soviet Union in the 1970s). At the same time, China is facing severe economic difficulties. With China (probably) and Europe (definitely) unhappy, does that open perspectives for concertation or even cooperation?

The problem is that in recent years China has given Europe little reason to trust it, because of its history of non-implementation of agreements in the economic sphere. In response to an American trade war, China would be well advised to at least settle some of its economic differences with the EU, but it could also opt to compensate for losses on the American market by dumping even more in Europe instead. In the background is the major debate within the Chinese leadership: continue to prioritise security and ideology, or return to a more pragmatic economic course?

In any case, however, if a European coalition guarantees the security of Ukraine, major Chinese interests are at stake. Europe must make it very clear to China that it is serious and will assume the risk of war to defend Ukraine – and that, therefore, China has every interest in putting pressure on Russia not to invade again. For in a Russo-European war, China will not be able to pretend to stay neutral: it either loses all economic links with Europe, or breaks solidarity with Russia. It can ill afford either.

At 27 or Not: Demonstrating Leadership

Who in Europe will take the lead? Some decisions must be taken by the EU as such: the accession of Ukraine, sanctions against Russia. Others require national decisions: a security guarantee, deploying troops, building military capabilities. The problem is that there is today no single format that can take decisions on all dimensions of strategy, let alone war (or even a proxy war as in Ukraine): some decisions are taken by NATO, others by the EU, many in ad hoc settings. That single format cannot be a large body that decides by consensus. It will never be sufficiently agile.

President Macron’s initiative to convene a number of leaders was exactly right, therefore. His plan, with Prime Minister Starmer, for a European “reassurance” force is the first concrete proposal on the table. This demonstrates that Europe, in effect, needs a “war cabinet”: a small number of leaders, mandated by their peers, to conduct negotiations (or, in case of war, operations), and who cover the full spectrum of strategy (political – economic – military).

That “war cabinet” must include the two European nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany and Poland, for their economic and military weight. It must further include the EU and NATO as such: the President of the European Council and/or the Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO, who liaise with and ensure the mandate from the broader membership. Let us be clear, though: one or two outliers in the Council or the NAC must not be allowed to block consensus – times are too serious to play silly games. Finally, the members of the “war cabinet” must be supported by their Chiefs of Defence and the Chairs of the EU and NATO Military Committees.

Conclusion: Big and Risky Decisions

Great powers politics is not new; for 2000 years, multiple great powers have cooperated, competed, and rivalled with each other, in ever shifting constellations. Europeans had just stopped thinking about it; they better get their wits together fast. All the more so because one thing is new: the US may no longer by default be a steadfast ally on all vital issues. And the US is led by an administration that lets ideology drive strategy. In strategic history, that seldom ends well; it certainly means that all Europe’s rational arguments on how the US is damaging its own prosperity and security by damaging Europe’s may well fall on deaf ears. If reasoning does not work, acting will.

Now is the time for Europeans to take momentous decisions. The responsibility may seem overwhelming; but refusing to decide is even more risky. We are in the realm of Grand Strategy. The essence of Grand Strategy is simple – we abandon Ukraine, or we stand by it – but it is never easy.

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop has read too many books about how the first and second world war started not to be worried.

This article was also published in Dutch in Knack.

(Photo credit: Sven Biscop)