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Transnationalism: a New Way of Thinking about Migration?

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In the rich panoply of theories of international relations, transnationalism could be analysed as an attempt to overcome the divide between stato-centric realism and the liberal vision

 

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Transnationalism: a New Way of Thinking about Migration?

A theory of international relations…

In the rich panoply of theories of international relations, transnationalism could be analysed as an attempt to overcome the divide between stato-centric realism, in which the state is the central, if not the only, actor in these relations, and the liberal vision, according to which the main protagonists in international politics are rational individuals (1). Inspired by globalisation, which is seen as an intensification of interdependence, this paradigm focuses on the impact of non-state actors on international politics and on the relationships that are built up in the global space beyond the national state framework and that are achieved while escaping, at least in part, from the control and mediating action of states.

In more graphic terms, transnationalism analyses international relations as a game of billiards in which the balls of states with complete control of the territory, people and resources within (their) borders move and collide, usually in response to external impulses, superimposed on the ‘cobweb’ made up of all the transnational activities (financial, economic and commercial, social and cultural) that make up globalisation. In other words, the sovereign autonomy of states is limited by the complexity of the networks in which they operate, but non-state actors do not interact ‘off the ground’ and operate in the context of geopolitical balances whose determination is beyond their control.

Opening up new perspectives…

Where does migration fit into all this? Several lines of thought can be deduced from this hypothesis.

First of all, the universalisation of the nation state, the product of the Treaties of Westphalia, as the (ultimate?) form of governance of human communities, is the founding element of the figure of the migrant. Understood as a legitimate and sovereign authority exercised over a population gathered on a territory, the state must, on the one hand, control access to the territory over which its ‘imperium’ is exercised and, on the other hand, consolidate the identity of the nation of which it is the emanation. In other words, it is the guarantor of the boundary between ‘them’ and ‘us’, thus defining the migrant as a ‘stranger’ to his or her territory and community.

Transnationalism aims to go beyond this monolithic vision. Migration is one of those flows that encircle the actions of states and whose growing strength, fuelled largely by the explosion in the number of forced displacements as a result of natural or human causes, leads us to measure the limits of a classic conception of sovereignty. Migrants have gone from being the target of national-statutory policies to becoming individual or collective actors in transnational relations. They do not move in a vacuum: the space remains marked out by the borders of states whose vocation it is to lay down the rules of this mobility. But whatever its incarnation, from the overqualified expert to the ethnic minority fleeing persecution, it helps to give shape and meaning to international relations. The influence of diasporas and the impact of financial transfers to countries of origin are the most studied symptoms of this reversal but, more fundamentally, it is the opening up of cultural spaces thanks to modern information and communication technologies that is at stake.

Quickly closed?

Does this hypothesis stand up to the reality test? There is room for doubt. It can be explained by a classic phenomenon that has been highlighted by epistemology and is particularly visible in the recent history of international relations theories, namely the influence of context on the genesis, success and decline of paradigms. Transnationalism is the offspring of the end of the bipolar world, which succeeded the great wars of hegemonic transition 1914-1945, and is the translation of a vision of a world where communication would replace power in the context of a happy globalisation seeing interdependencies managed by societal transactions. The pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and, more generally, the transition to new geopolitical balances have put the state back at the centre of the game and consigned the trans-nationalist vision to the shelf of naïve idealism.

The European experience…

Having said that, let’s turn to the European Union. In many respects, it is a unique example of regional integration, described as supranational in that it is based in many areas on the joint exercise of the prerogatives of sovereignty of the states that make it up, usually by delegation to institutions set up for that purpose.

This is particularly true of the organisation of the free movement of persons within an area without internal borders, the legacy of the Schengen Agreement and Convention, which was founded on the dual requirement of solidarity and mutual trust. The opening up of such an area was only possible thanks to the adoption of police and judicial cooperation measures designed to guarantee internal security despite the abolition of border controls, but also and above all to the pooling of external border controls. The latter presupposes the adoption of common criteria for access to the territory, or, in the current terms of the Lisbon Treaty, common immigration and asylum policies.

As is the case in all the European Union’s areas of intervention, these policies are gradually being built up through constant transactional negotiation between the Member States and the common institutions, according to the perception of the common good and under the pressure of crises which generally have the effect of shifting the centre of gravity of the European balance.

This was the case with the migratory crisis of 2015-2016, whose response – or rather lack of response – revealed a profound crisis of solidarity between the Member States and gave rise to a sudden lack of confidence in the institutions. Accelerating an already strong tendency to consider migration management as a security issue, it put the national concerns of the States back at the centre of the game and placed the Commission, in principle the guarantor of the common interest, in a weak position from which it tried to emerge by proposing a ‘new pact’ on immigration and asylum.

And its contradictions…

It was adopted in the spring of 2024 after long and difficult negotiations. It introduces a complex system that will take two years to implement and will require significant resources. But doubts are already being expressed about its relevance, and many political players are now calling for a ‘more effective’ policy involving closer cooperation with third countries.

Under the general concept of ‘externalising’ migration policy, there are a number of initiatives with more or less precise outlines, ranging from the relocation, or even transfer, of responsibilities for international protection, to generous multi-sector ‘partnerships’ aimed essentially at securing the cooperation of neighbouring countries in filtering arrivals at external borders, and more or less accepted forms of conditionality linked to the cooperation of third countries in implementing a return policy of limited effectiveness.

Paradoxically, this is creating new forms of dependence at a time when the European Union is seeking to ensure its strategic autonomy, which is essential if it is to consolidate its position in a world system in transition. The relationship with the countries of the southern neighbourhood, essentially determined by the objective of controlling migratory flows, illustrates this paradox, which will be at the heart of the mandate of the member of the new Commission responsible for the Mediterranean.

But the European approach to migration is not without its paradoxes, since at the same time it is advocating more immigration. The argument is twofold, demographic (shrinking and ageing populations) and economic (labour shortages), and while the profiles targeted may be different (settlement migration on the one hand, labour mobility on the other), the range of legal channels on offer is increasingly broad, even if in a fragmented way, with the Member States retaining most of the powers in this area. And this development is taking place at a time when, with the ‘Global Gateway’ initiative, the European Union intends to develop a policy of productive investment in developing countries, which presupposes the training and consolidation of local expertise.

Confirming the relevance of transnationalism

What lessons can we draw from this European experience? Undoubtedly, as in any scientific debate, each paradigm makes its own contribution to understanding complex realities. In this case, the trans-nationalist hypothesis illustrates the extent to which migration, which states claim to be regaining control over, is a structuring factor in international relations and therefore influences the relative autonomy of state actors in a given context. Placing migration management among the priorities of foreign policy implicitly enshrines this interdependence: the billiard ball model and the cobweb model.

 

(1) For a full description of the trans-nationalist perspective, please refer to the chapter by D.Battistella, J.Cornut and E.Baranets in their excellent book ‘Théories des relations internationales’ (6th edition-Paris: Presses de Sciences Po,2019,pp.205-242), where you will find the many references that inspired this very brief article.

 


Disclaimer: This contribution was presented at the Belgian Moroccan Academic Forum organized in Brussels on 8 and 9 February 2024 by the University of Liège, the “Cercle des Lauréats de Belgique au Maroc”, the University Mohammed Premier of Oujda and Management School of Casablanca.

 


(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)