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Towards a Peace Compromise or the Continuation of War?

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A lot of ink has been spilt over the past few weeks about the rising tensions within the Western Alliance and between Ukraine and the United States. However, the geopolitical shifts also caused the various parties to lay their first cards on the table regarding a possible peace compromise between Ukraine and Russia and the future European security architecture. Although the extreme positions still seem incompatible, a realistic and pragmatic peace compromise will require concessions from all sides. These concessions are primarily necessary between the two warring parties – the defender Ukraine and the aggressor Russia – but also between the United States and Europe regarding the division of roles in the future European security architecture. Nonetheless, if the current crisis in the Western camp is not managed well and the United States abandons the continent, the window of opportunity for a peace deal will close and the war will likely continue – which entails possible disastrousness outcomes for Ukrainian and Transatlantic security.

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Towards a Peace Compromise or the Continuation of War?

A lot of ink has been spilt over the past few weeks about the rising tensions within the Western Alliance and between Ukraine and the United States. However, the geopolitical shifts also caused the various parties to lay their first cards on the table regarding a possible peace compromise between Ukraine and Russia and the future European security architecture. Although the extreme positions still seem incompatible, a realistic and pragmatic peace compromise will require concessions from all sides. These concessions are primarily necessary between the two warring parties – the defender Ukraine and the aggressor Russia – but also between the United States and Europe regarding the division of roles in the future European security architecture. Nonetheless, if the current crisis in the Western camp is not managed well and the United States abandons the continent, the window of opportunity for a peace deal will close and the war will likely continue – which entails possible disastrousness outcomes for Ukrainian and Transatlantic security.

Subsequently, while there is a severe crisis within the NATO alliance, Europeans must not overreact and create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. While US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said that European NATO allies should look after their conventional deterrence and defence, he at the same time stressed continued US commitment to the Alliance. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also indicated that Ukraine and Europe will be involved in the ‘real’ peace negotiations. While details about the form of involvement remain unclear, Wolfgang Ischinger, President of the Munich Security Conference Foundation Council, proposed a contact group format “introduced in the 1990s to create a sense of unity and common purpose under U.S. leadership”. Russian President Putin also appeared willing to discuss the issue of peace negotiations, following exploratory talks between the US and Russia in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, a key question is whether, among the various and sometimes contradictory signals of recent days, the contours of a possible peace compromise are emerging after three years of war.

Armed Neutrality & EU Membership in Exchange for Freezing the Frontlines

Based on the opening moves, the following scenario seems to offer a possible solution. Ukraine could combine armed neutrality – which includes continued Western (European and US) military support and training – with EU membership. Although Russia would have to give in in terms of demilitarising Ukraine (which is currently an unachievable goal anyway), EU membership appears to be acceptable to Russia. Ukraine and its partners should agree with the freezing of the current front line without legally recognizing a new border. They should also promise not to regain its legitimate control over the Donbas and Crimea by force – as West Germany promised about reuniting with East Germany during the Cold War – and, obviously, a deal means that vice versa Russia should commit not to use force either.

This is of course not ideal, but so is any compromise. In any case, the military reality is that Ukraine is currently not capable of liberating these territories; today, it rather risks losing even more. Ukraine would temporarily need to give up a significant part of its population and territory. Russia would have to accept EU membership and armed neutrality for Ukraine. On the one hand, EU membership fulfils partly Ukraine’s desire to be part of the European family. On the other hand, freezing the frontline correspond to the Russian and US views on recognising the ‘reality’ on the ground.

Automatic NATO Membership to Deter Renewed Russian Aggression

In addition, there are voices in the US calling for automatic NATO membership for Ukraine in case of renewed Russian aggression as a ‘tripwire’. In other words, if Russia does not start a third invasion, Ukraine will not become a formal Ally. Indeed, Putin keeps pointing to the supposedly ‘offensive’ threat posed by further NATO expansion to the east – which is not correct because NATO is a defensive alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. If an Ally attacks another state, the other Allies are thus not required to join the attacking Ally (e.g., the 2003 US war against Iraq).

Some scholars have also argued that the Russian invasion is a ‘preventive war’ to avert Ukraine joining NATO. Such a development would result in a significant negative shift in the balance of power for Russia. Subsequently, by keeping Ukraine out of the Alliance, this ‘tripwire’ would solve – in Russia’s & some experts’ perception – a root cause of the war. While such a conditional form of NATO membership seems like a paradox, it is worth exploring. On the one hand, this option responds to Russia’s aversion to NATO expansion to the East. On the other hand, it also considers the US opposition to welcoming Ukraine to NATO in the short term. Indeed, without consensus within the Alliance, a candidate cannot become a member anyway. Automatic NATO membership in case of renewed Russian aggression represents thus a ‘second best option’ for Ukraine (the best being unconditional NATO membership). This option also seems acceptable for the Europeans because such a ‘tripwire’ keeps the United States involved.

European Troops in Ukraine to Guarantee the Peace

On 2 March 2025, under the leadership of France and the United Kingdom, European states formulated a peace plan that included the deployment of a ‘coalition of the willing’. Scholars have also been proponents of the idea. Sven Biscop argued in this regard that “It is logical that Europeans provide the boots on the ground for a security guarantee; Ukraine will be joining the EU, not the US”. While a European conventional force with strategic support from the United States would indeed be necessary to credibly guarantee peace in Ukraine and deter renewed Russian aggression, there are some critical issues of concern. Firstly, on the European side, there is disunity in participating in such a military deployment. Secondly, on the American side, US President Trump seemed to support the idea of European troops in Ukraine to guarantee peace.  On 3 March 2025, however, US Vice-President JD Vance rejected the European plan to deploy troops under French and British leadership. Lastly, on the Russian side, officials have stated that European troops in Ukraine would be unacceptable. In contrast, US President Trump claimed that Putin would accept such a deployment.

In any case, first, a peace or ceasefire must be agreed upon before any European troop deployment in Ukraine becomes possible. Therefore, Europeans should also formulate a fall-back option in case deployment in Ukraine remains impossible. European troops could, for instance, be forward stationed in Eastern Europe close to the border with Ukraine. Subsequently, such a deterrence force could intervene in the event of renewed Russian aggression – as this would activate Ukrainian NATO membership. Alternatively, establishing a No-Fly Zone over Ukraine should also be considered. At the beginning of the war, in March 2022, the option of a No-Fly Zone was explored, however, the risks were deemed too high as this could escalate the war horizontally. Nevertheless, after a peace deal or ceasefire, a No-Fly Zone with European aircraft patrolling the Ukrainian skies could thus be contemplated in case ‘boots on the ground’ are impossible.

 

The Risk of Failure

Nonetheless, while US President Donald J. Trump seems to quickly want a peace deal, the warring states – Ukraine and Russia – always have the last word. Especially, if the aim is to create a durable peace, both sides will need to be adequately satisfied with the settlement. That said, the continuation of the war also remains a likely scenario. It has arguably become even more likely given the bilateral tensions between Ukraine and the United States – of which the unprecedented and shameful discussion in the Oval Office between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US Vice President JD Vance, and US President Trump was the latest illustration. Moreover, on 3 March 2025, the Trump administration halted its military aid to Ukraine, presumably to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate and sign the minerals deal with the United States. These events, however, weaken the Ukrainian position and could embolden Russia to continue its offensive.

 

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr. Alexander Mattelaer and Dr. Sven Biscop for their comments on an earlier version of the commentary. The views expressed in this Egmont Commentary are those of the author alone, and any errors are the sole responsibility of the author. From a historical perspective, he finds the parallels between the major actors during the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the 170 years later possible troop deployment to guarantee peace in Ukraine striking.

 

 


(Photo credit: Wannes Verstraete)