The Manned-Unmanned Warfare of Tomorrow

The deployment of unmanned systems in recent years has changed the nature of warfare in multiple ways. Subsequently, considering Belgium’s budgetary context, the personnel constraints that the armed forces face, the limitations of the traditional defence industry, and the turbulent geopolitical situation, it may be advantageous to look for innovative, asymmetric, and disruptive solutions such as unmanned systems.

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The Manned-Unmanned Warfare of Tomorrow

The deployment of unmanned systems in recent years has changed the nature of warfare in multiple ways. Subsequently, considering Belgium’s budgetary context, the personnel constraints that the armed forces face, the limitations of the traditional defence industry, and the turbulent geopolitical situation, it may be advantageous to look for innovative, asymmetric, and disruptive solutions such as unmanned systems. While drones should not be considered ‘super weapons’ and fully autonomous, unmanned warfare may not be for the near future, the Belgian armed forces should embrace manned-unmanned cooperation to be ready for tomorrow’s battlefield. Nevertheless, the Belgian parliamentary debate on arming unmanned aerial systems has not yet been settled. As a result, the next government will need to decide to arm unmanned systems and start exploring the possibilities these systems can provide.

Types of Unmanned Systems

Drones or unmanned systems come in a variety of types. A first distinction can be made based on the warfighting domain, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV), and Unmanned Space Vehicles (USV). A second distinction is the difference between unmanned systems that are used on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This distinction entails often a third difference in range as smaller drones cannot conduct long-range missions. FPV (First Person View) drones, for example, have usually a short range. Some of the smallest drones are called nano- or micro-UAVs. Bigger drones can be categorised as medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs or high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs (similar variances based on range can also be found in other warfighting domains).

A fourth distinction in the design of unmanned systems across the warfighting domains also exists. UAVs can, for instance, use a fixed-wing, single-rotor, multi-rotor or fixed-wing hybrid design. Fifthly, unmanned military systems can be categorised into armed or unarmed systems and are used for a range of missions from strikes to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). A final distinction is based on the degree of autonomy that is used for operating and commanding the unmanned system.

Unarmed Unmanned Systems

The Belgian armed forces already use several unmanned systems today and have some acquisition programmes for future capabilities. Some examples include the replacement of the B-Hunter UAV with the more capable MQ-9B SkyGuardian used by the Air and Space Component for information and ISR missions. Furthermore, the Land Component also uses a variety of smaller drones for similar missions such as the PUMA Long Endurance, the RAVEN, and the Parrot ANAFI. The Naval Component, in turn, uses unmanned surface and underwater mine warfare vehicles developed and built in Ostend. The issue is that the set of missions is still too limited – especially given the potential of armed unmanned systems.

Armed Unmanned Systems

Meanwhile, in all warfighting domains, unmanned systems are used to carry out combat tasks. In the Russian war against Ukraine, both sides use various UAVs to carry out attacks in addition to information and ISR missions. For instance, Iran supplies Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones to Russia. Smaller, homemade FPV drones with improvised explosive devices are also widely used. Such systems are countered in turn by innovation in air defence systems. Besides shooting down drones with artillery, missiles or even other drones, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities are also being used.

In the maritime domain, Ukraine has already successfully conducted attacks with Magura V5 and Sea Baby unmanned kamikaze vessels on the Russian Black Sea fleet. Armed underwater drones are also under development, such as the Ukrainian TLK-150. There are also several types of unmanned ground vehicles. Some smaller systems are used for ISR missions or can be armed with a machine gun, larger types can carry heavier weapon systems such as a medium-calibre gun or anti-tank missiles.

The Belgian Debate on Autonomous Weapons Systems

Besides the limited resources of the Belgian armed forces, another reason can be found for the lack of armed unmanned systems. During the previous legislature, there was no political consensus amongst the parties in the coalition government in favour of arming remotely controlled unmanned systems. In addition, there was extensive debate in parliament about banning autonomous weapons systems (AWS). It is important here to make a clear distinction between remotely controlled drones, and unmanned systems that can operate completely autonomously and make decisions on the command or use of force.

There are several international law, ethical and moral questions to be raised about autonomous systems that decide to use force against people based on Artificial Intelligence. Belgium can, therefore, advocate for regulating autonomous weapons systems that cannot meet the requirements of international humanitarian law and advocate the principle of ‘meaningful human control’. However, at the same time, the armed forces can arm unmanned human-controlled systems.

The Limits of Unmanned Systems

The introduction of unmanned systems has, nonetheless, in many cases not rendered manned systems obsolete. Apart from the statements made by some entrepreneurs regarding the uselessness of the new F-35 fighter aircraft in the age of drones, defence analysts argue that given the current technological knowledge, unmanned systems cannot yet replace manned systems such as advanced fighter aircraft. Unmanned systems do not have, according to Stacie Pettyjohn, the “range, survivability, and payload capacity” of manned systems.

Moreover, autonomous guidance cannot yet deal with dynamic environments with countless exceptions and unpredictability – as the problems of autonomous cars illustrate – as well as adversarial strategic behaviour. Previous research has also pointed out that aerial vehicles, whether manned or unmanned, have to deal with the lethality of modern air defences, which in turn limits the effectiveness of many current-generation long-range drones unless they possess key technologies (e.g., low observability, electronic warfare) and are supported by numerous and advanced assets, proficient personnel and organisational planning. Nonetheless, given the current technological innovation and trajectory regarding unmanned systems, cooperation between manned and unmanned systems will be central in the warfare of tomorrow.

Conclusions

Armed and unarmed unmanned systems can thus be force multipliers for the Belgian Defence. Consequently, internal experiments should be conducted on a larger scale within all Components of the armed forces regarding manned-unmanned cooperation. Some suggestions include exploring how ‘loyal wingman’ unmanned aerial vehicles could in the future assist F-35 fighter aircraft with additional weapons or sensors. The Netherlands is also investing in low-manned vessels that can be armed with containerised payloads such as missiles. This would quickly and meaningfully strengthen the Royal Netherlands Navy. The Belgian Naval Component already cooperates intensively with their Dutch counterparts regarding frigates and minehunters within the bilateral naval cooperation called BENESAM. Belgium could thus learn from the Dutch experience with low-manned vessels.

In addition, unmanned aerial and ground systems can assist soldiers from the Land Component in both combat and support tasks, as well as the Medical Component, for instance, for evacuating casualties in hard-to-reach or dangerous places. Furthermore, the new Cyber Command has an important role here. In short, the key goal should be to create synergies between manned and unmanned systems with ‘meaningful human control’ as the guiding principle regarding the degree of autonomy.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr. Alexander Mattelaer (Egmont Institute & Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Dr. Sven Biscop (Egmont Institute & Universiteit Gent), Dr. Mauro Gilli (Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich), and the anonymous Belgian officer for their feedback on earlier versions of the commentary. The views expressed in this Egmont Commentary are those of the author alone, and any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

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