No Time to Waste in Rebuilding the Belgian Armed Forces

The voters have dealt the cards. Now it is up to the winning parties from both parts of the country to negotiate a federal government. In 2020, Belgium almost broke its own record again for the longest post-election period without a government.

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No Time to Waste in Rebuilding the Belgian Armed Forces

The voters have dealt the cards. Now it is up to the winning parties from both parts of the country to negotiate a federal government. In 2020, Belgium almost broke its own record again for the longest post-election period without a government. However, Belgium does not have the time now for prolonged navel-gazing. Indeed, geopolitical instability continues to grow. After two years of Russian aggression (or ten if you start counting correctly from 2014), Ukraine is stuck on the defensive. The conflict in Gaza between Hamas and Israel continues and may yet provoke a wider confrontation with Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. Tensions also exist elsewhere in the world that could degenerate into wars, just think of the situation around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

According to the latest data published by NATO, Belgium is stuck at the bottom of the ranking of military expenditure. Many allies have already met or exceeded the agreed minimum, others have caught up following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Only Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain perform worse in terms of defence spending efforts. However, these countries are currently more ambitious: Slovenia aims for 2% of GDP by 2030, and Spain targets 2029. At the 2023 Summit, Luxembourg received an exception from NATO, allowing them to use a calculation basis of 2% of GNI instead of GDP. Their policy aim is to reach the NATO target by 2030. This leaves Belgium alone at the lowest position, with a delayed deadline to meet the NATO standard by 2035.

The outgoing coalition took some steps forward to rebuild the Belgian armed forces. However, this effort was clearly inadequate against the backdrop of growing geopolitical threats and the speed at which allies have changed course. The most important document for Defence, Minister Ludivine Dedonder’s STAR plan, was drawn up way before the Russian invasion of 2022. Unfortunately, in the last two years, the government did not undertake a review that seriously considered the consequences of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In Belgium, the sense of urgency regarding these international security risks is clearly low. This has led the outgoing government to follow a policy path that failed to account for the geopolitical shockwaves rippling through Europe and abroad. While many countries viewed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a wake-up call, Belgium remains in a state of complacency. With the war in Ukraine now in its third year, combined with upcoming American elections in November, Belgium can no longer afford to delay acting.

Effective policy begins with a realistic assessment of today’s geopolitical landscape. For too long, Western European countries have overlooked both conventional and non-conventional threats from the East, particularly from Russia. This stands in stark contrast to Eastern European countries, which have warned about the Russian threat for at least a decade and are now facing a pre-war era. Collective defence is once again a top priority. However, we must avoid the mistake of neglecting other regions with instability. Amongst those, ignoring the nonconventional threats on NATO’s Southern Flank will have long-term consequences for Europe.

There is thus some work for the next government to do. A review of the current defence strategy seems inevitable. The enforced plan must be ambitious and recognise the urgency emanating from the international security environment. It should not only emphasize the importance of the NATO alliance, but act and contribute its fair share. Reaffirming Belgium’s role within the alliance’s nuclear strategy is also crucial here. Besides strengthening the armed forces, Belgium needs to free up sufficient resources for diplomacy and development cooperation. International geopolitical challenges require a broad set of instruments.

Reaching the NATO standard is not an end in itself; the true goal is to modernize the Belgian armed forces to effectively address security risks and fulfil alliance obligations. To achieve and sustain investments in those essential capabilities, allocating at least 2% of Belgium’s GDP to Defence is a necessity. Belgium must accelerate its increase in defence spending to reach the 2% norm, at the latest by the end of the new legislature in 2029. Furthermore, there are several priorities for Defence on which the next government must focus.

Staffing remains one of the biggest challenges. Belgian Defence is experiencing a significant wave of retirements and poor retention rates among recruits. Despite these challenges, it is crucial to grow the workforce to 30,000 military personnel and chart a path towards 40,000. This growth is necessary to create, among other things, a second mechanized brigade alongside the existing medium brigade. Such heavy armour is essential for deterring aggression against our most vulnerable allies in the Baltic region. Proper pay, more stimulating prospects in the form of training and readiness along the eastern flank, modern equipment, upgraded infrastructure and training facilities and a better geographical distribution of military bases can help here. Additionally, efforts should be made to expand the existing reserve that supports active units and to consider establishing a voluntary territorial reserve to provide additional capacity in times of need.

Personnel require various material resources, necessitating an increase in the defence operating budget. There are widespread indicators that current stocks of ammunition, equipment, and operational resources are insufficient. Urgent steps are required to upgrade the organization’s infrastructure, spanning investments from IT to buildings. Subsequently, additional large procurement projects in equipment are pressing. The prior federal governments have decided to replace and modernise core capabilities in too limited numbers. Therefore, the current investment package fails to adequately address the deteriorating security environment. In short, additional F-35s, a third frigate, more ammunition, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft defence, armed unmanned systems (both on land, sea and air), medical equipment, cyber & space capabilities and heavy mechanised vehicles are needed.

Since prominent allies have placed large orders before us, Belgium often risks being at the back of the queue for desired capabilities. In the short term, however, Belgium can invest in cheaper, asymmetric capabilities that have a significant impact on the battlefield today, for instance, (small) armed unmanned systems. In the long term, to secure the necessary stocks and modernization of capabilities in the future, orders should be placed sooner rather than later. Related to this, are the ongoing discussions for Europe on how to ramp up its own industrial production. Belgium should actively advocate for further coordination and funding EU efforts. Proposals such as Euro-defence bonds could significantly enhance the EU’s defence ambitions.

Another key priority should be the development of a logistics ecosystem. Due to Belgium’s geographical location, we have a specific role to play within the NATO alliance. As a transit nation, Belgium must be prepared to provide sufficient support in case of a large deployment on the Eastern flank. Additionally, as a host nation, Belgium would be a crucial part of the logistics, offering essential services such as medical support and stock management. This also requires extensive collaboration with the private sector. Therefore, investments in a wide array of plans, capacities and infrastructure are crucial to ensure Belgium can effectively fulfil its international responsibilities.

Furthermore, additional investments in infrastructure need to be made. For instance, the outgoing government unveiled plans for ‘quarters of the future’, but here too, things could be shifted up a gear. Besides a more geographical dispersion of bases to improve accessibility for military personnel, there is a purely military reason for this: clustering capabilities in large bases may be interesting from efficiency considerations, but it also makes it easier for potential adversaries to destroy military infrastructure. For instance, reactivating several military airfields may allow Defence to better disperse its valuable resources and thus better accommodate potential missile attacks, in addition to much-needed investments in anti-aircraft defences.

Philip Zelikow, an experienced US diplomat and historian, argues that the next three years may be the most dangerous for the United States, and therefore, its allies as well. The authoritarians know that the West is relatively weak in the coming years and that it has only begun to rebuild its democratic arsenal. Consequently, Belgium has no time to lose to catch up.

Wannes Verstraete is a PhD Researcher and Teaching Assistant at the Political Science Department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), specialising in deterrence and arms control, and is an Associate Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at the Egmont Institute.

Michelle Haas is a PhD researcher at the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies, specialising in European defence policies. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Sciences and a Master’s degree in Conflict and Development.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)