How the War in Ukraine Shapes the Multipolar World
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Had China backed Russia like the EU and the US back Ukraine, that would have been a tipping point for international politics. The world would have fallen apart again in two rival blocs: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese, with Ukraine as the first battleground of a 21st century bipolar confrontation.
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How the War in Ukraine Shapes the Multipolar World
Had China backed Russia like the EU and the US back Ukraine, that would have been a tipping point for international politics. The world would have fallen apart again in two rival blocs: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese, with Ukraine as the first battleground of a 21st century bipolar confrontation.
But that is not what has happened. While China’s rhetoric definitely favours Russia, its actual policy is more akin to non-intervention: it certainly does not reduce its relations with Russia, but it does not do anything more to support it either, while it keeps open its channels to the EU and the US and even Ukraine. In practice, the Middle Kingdom stays right in the middle.
The reaction of the various powers to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine thus confirms that we are in a multipolar world. There are several powers, some of which cooperate more with each other than with others, but in the end each power pursues its own course towards each of the other powers in light of its own interests.
That is good news, for the alternative, a new bipolarity, would be detrimental to the interests of the EU. Two blocs that decouple all relations would be an economic catastrophe; it would render an effective climate policy impossible; and it would reduce the EU to a secondary role, as deputy of the US, in a secondary theatre, for the main confrontation would take place in Asia, not in Europe.
The risk of a return to bipolarity has not gone away, however. An escalation of tensions between the US and China might yet bring it about. If China would have recourse to war to pursue its interests, for example, (which, unlike Russians, Americans, and Europeans, it has not done since its 1979 war against Vietnam, recent border incidents with India notwithstanding), that would undoubtedly be a game-changer.
What Can the West Bring to a Multipolar World?
Moreover, multipolarity is very complex to navigate. If the Ukraine war ends on a military stalemate, without a peace agreement or even a formal ceasefire (as seems increasingly likely), the EU and the US will maintain their sanctions against Russia, for years if necessary. Basically, the world will see a “mini cold war” between, on the one hand, the EU and NATO countries and their closest partners (such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) and, on the other hand, Russia. But “the West” will maintain relations with China (fraught though they may be) even as China continues its partnership with Russia.
China is not the only major player not to adopt sanctions against Russia, though: neither has India, nor the large majority of states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Many countries are facing other, more urgent challenges. Or they see the war as another instance of great powers doing what great powers do, and do not feel inclined to pronounce on it either way.
Multipolarity does not go together with Manicheism, therefore: the EU and the US should resist the temptation of depicting international politics as a confrontation between democrats and autocrats. The reality is that not all democracies are always on their side, while they need some of the autocracies to support them, if only to supply the natural resources which they no longer import (and will not for many years) from Russia. The world is not driven by values, but by states pursuing their interests.
In that context, being against Russia is not enough to convince states to side with the EU and the US, let alone being against China. Other states, especially those that enjoy close partnership with Russia and/or China, want to know: what can the EU and the US offer them? What are they for?
One World
For the EU, the overall project ought to be to keep the world together: one world order, with a core set of rules, to which all states subscribe, because they need a stable political and financial-economic framework to pursue their interests. Multilateralism comes naturally to the EU, but it must play a much more proactive role, both in the existing international organisations and in new, ad hoc coalitions, convening democracies and non-democracies that share an interest in concrete solutions for specific problems.
Keeping all states in the system will mean compromise, but that is preferable by far to major powers leaving the system and undermining it from the outside. Compromise with other powers only makes sense, of course, if they abide by the rules of the system, both old and new. Which is a challenge, notable as regards China.
For the EU to prove to the world that it has something to offer, the Global Gateway, its answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is of vital importance. That is what the EU can bring: substantial investment in infrastructure (in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research). Crucially, the EU must not mistake the Global Gateway for a development project. It is a strategic project, with the aim of firmly anchoring the EU’s presence in countries of strategic interest, and ensuring that other powers do not gain exclusive influence there. The role of development policy is instrumental, rather: it can help countries in need to build the absorption capacity to implement the Global Gateway.
Can the US subscribe to the “One World Project”? Its own Build Back Better Framework in the end focuses on domestic rather than international investment. Whoever occupies the White House, rivalry with China will remain the US’ number one strategic priority, rather than the multilateral system as such. A lot depends on the future direction that China itself will take, of course. Its geoeconomic strategy thrives under the stability that “One World” provides. But strident nationalism and increasing authoritarianism may also produce more confrontational policies.
Predicting, or even launching war, is easy enough. Building peace is much more difficult. While it must strengthen its own deterrence and resilience, that is the role of the EU. As long as there is the slightest chance of success, the effort must continue.
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Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop (Egmont Institute and Ghent University) is the author of Grand Strategy in 10 Words – A Guide to Great Power Politics in the 21st Century.
(Photo credit: Sven Biscop)