Elections in DRC’s Masi-Manimba: Battle of Honour for the Electoral Commission?
In
In December 2023, as part of the 2023 general elections in the DRCongo, elections were held in Masi-Manimba territory (to the East of Kinshasa) but were cancelled because of irregularities by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). They were done over again one year later on 15 December 2024, with the aim of doing things as they should this time. Were they really?
*****
Elections in DRC’s Masi-Manimba: Battle of Honour for the Electoral Commission?
In December 2023, as part of the 2023 general elections in the DRCongo, elections were held in Masi-Manimba territory (to the East of Kinshasa) but were cancelled because of irregularities by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). They were done over again one year later on 15 December 2024, with the aim of doing things as they should this time. Were they really?
The 2023 legislative elections in the DRC were tainted by important levels of fraud and corruption, significantly reducing the legitimacy of the current members of the DRC National Assembly. The CENI tried to recover part of its credibility by its 5 January 2024 decision to cancel the electoral results of 82 candidates for national or provincial deputy or for local councillor. The elections in the territories of Masi-Manimba (East of Kinshasa) and in Yakoma (North-West of DRC) were also cancelled, adding 11 national and 12 provincial disqualified deputies to the list of disqualified candidates..
According to the CENI, the December 2023 electoral process in Masi-Manimba was marred by acts of violence, vandalism, and sabotage perpetrated by some candidates, directed against voters and the local CENI infrastructure and personnel. Press reports mentioned the destruction of at least 50 polling stations, the private use of official CENI voting machines, and corruption of CENI personnel. On 21 December 2023, eight candidates requested to cancel the ongoing elections and pointed the finger to national ministers and current and former officials.
The names of several well-known political figures were mentioned as actors of the fraud. Local witnesses refer to the use of up to 80 CENI voting machines by some candidates to print already completed ballot papers, a practice widely criticized in many DRC electoral constituencies in 2023.
Masi-Manimba elections one year later: better than before?
The elections in Masi-Manimba were held again, one year later, on 15 December 2024. The president of the Independent Electoral Commission Denis Kadima declared that past errors would carefully be avoided, adding that “These elections offer an opportunity for the CENI to prove its commitment to increasingly transparent, inclusive and credible (electoral) processes”
Efforts were indeed made to this end, including timely delivery of voting materials and the delivery of duplicate voter cards where necessary. In December 2023 indeed, unreadable or unavailable voter cards were a huge problem.
When the first results were published, Mr. Kadima underlined the change of compared with 2023, such as the decrease of popularity for several candidates and their ranking. A closer look at the electoral process may provide less evidence for Mr. Kadima’s claim that the 2024 elections in Masi-Manimba more accurately reflect the voters’ choice. If there was a choice.
Who was provisionally elected?
The provisional results published by CENI declared five candidates as national deputies, among whom three deputies disqualified in 2023. Four had relatively high-level functions before the elections; one of the latter held posts of responsibility in almost any political coalition in power since Mobutu; the fifth is an economy professor from the University of Kinshasa and member of the previously not represented UDPS-Tshisekedi presidential political party.
According to local sources, none (except probably one previous provincial deputy) has any link with the local population apart from being born in Masi-Manimba territory. Their electoral campaign was conducted with important cash handouts, including to the voters aligned outside the polling booths, or with distribution of motorcycles to opinion leaders. As part of his personal campaign, one candidate distributed the quantity of salt previously sent by the government as official assistance (one cup of salt per family). The wealthier candidates paid their witnesses in the polling stations; this was a relatively lucrative operation for impoverished villagers who quickly lined up as witnesses for multiple candidates. One observer noted that the wealthy candidates consider the vote as a commercial transaction: once the vote is paid for, there is no longer any obligation of some sort of return for its constituency during his or her parliamentary mandate.
Transparency guaranteed?
The election was held on 15 December. The electoral commission CENI published the first “electoral trends” already on 16 December, surprisingly early considering the 768 polling stations in Masi-Manimba, the territory’s rural nature with important transport and mobility problems, absence of phone connections in non-urbanized areas, and poor infrastructure.
On 17 December, detailed provisional results were published by CENI. The manual counting of the polling stations’ electoral reports was completed only on 23 December and the results were not communicated.
Local sources express serious doubt about the accuracy of the data transmitted on 16-17 December. They allege the use (as in 2023) of parallel “private” voting machines to transfer fabricated results. The transfer necessitated the use an important number of satellite phones, some of which were not working. They also point to important discrepancies in the number of voters, sometimes going beyond the number of registered voters in an election with an alleged much lower voter turnout than the official CENI figure of 37,81%.
The results are contested by two non-provisionally elected candidates and the judicial electoral dispute procedure is ongoing. According to the CENI electoral calendar, final results will be published only on 25 February 2025, respecting the maximum legally permissible deadline. Is this delay really necessary to judge such a limited number of cases? According to some analysts, this is because the CENI wants to put pressure on the government to pay its arrears; according to others, this is necessary to allow for an internal elite agreement about which candidates will be accepted as deputies, in a process similar to what also happened after the 2023 election.
Or more of the same?
All in all, electoral fraud is difficult to prove. In any case, the candidates provisionally considered as elected by the CENI belong to the existing political elite of Masi-Manimba active in Kinshasa (apart from former provincial deputy Sindani) with substantial financial resources. If the official results indeed reflect the voters’ choice, their disqualification for electoral fraud in 2023 does not seem to have had much influence on the voting behaviour in Masi-Manimba. It confirms the dominance of “big men” based in the capital on local electoral processes.
Local sources confirm the disaffection of the voters for the electoral process, as reflected by the low turnout, probably caused by the conviction that their vote has little or no influence on the electoral result. The increasing gap between voters and elected political personnel is a nationwide trend and delegitimizes the electoral procedure as a legitimate instrument for access to political power and responsibility. Contrary to what CENI president Kadima claims, the Masi-Manimba elections bear many more resemblances than differences with December 2023.
Aspects of the electoral system contribute to widening the gap. Distribution of parliamentary seats in the first phase is based on the total number of votes for all candidates of a political party or grouping. This implies that if all candidates for a party or grouping together have a number of votes slightly higher than one single candidate from another party with a high electoral score, the latter may not be elected. This is very confusing for voters who vote for individuals, not for parties.
It is undoubtedly true that the electoral process in DRC lives up to much higher standards than most of its neighbour states. But first, that bar of comparison is very low, and second, the progressive hollowing out of its democratic quality over the years risks rendering this very costly operation useless in the end.
(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)