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**Understanding Uganda's
(ambiguous) actions in
Eastern DRC:
Military interventions to
protect roads and trade?**

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Introduction

Much attention has been given to the role of Rwanda in the conflict in Eastern DRC, and its support to M23. Much less attention has been given to the role of Uganda. In this briefing, we aim to fill this gap. We will show how that Uganda's presence in Eastern DRC has strong economic under- and overtones: much of Uganda's actions are centred around protecting trade and roads in Eastern DRC. This builds on historical relations between Uganda and Congolese traders – particularly the Nande and Hema business community – with whom it had been discussing these issues in the years prior to their military intervention. In doing so, Uganda primarily protects its own interests, and has ambiguous relations with all key-actors in the conflict – M23, Kigali and Kinshasa. We will show this by first explaining the broader history of economic relations between Uganda and Eastern DRC, and second, link this to its current actions.

But before we do so, let us briefly summarize Uganda's military actions in DRC since 2021. Uganda entered eastern DRC through Operation Shujaa on the 30th of November 2021. This operation was targeting the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was held responsible for suicide attacks in Kampala on the 16th of November 2021.¹ This operation slowly extended its zone of operation over time (see Image 2 below). However, after M23 took over Goma on the 27th of January 2025, the Uganda People Defence Forces (UPDF) equally quickly extended its zone of operation. On the 31st of January 2025, UPDF announced a "forward defensive posture" on the Uganda–DRC border, bringing in new troops. On the 10th of February 2025, the UPDF deployed in Ituri's Mahagi, in what it claims was a response to the massacres by the CODECO militia in the area. When M23 reached Bukavu, the other major town in Eastern DRC, the UPDF again extended its zone of operation – this time to Bunia. Throughout all these movements in the first half of 2025 (visualized on Image 2 below), the UPDF extended its zone of operation in Eastern DRC parallel to M23's extension.

What does this mean, and why does the UPDF do so? This paper will focus on elements which have not been sufficiently analysed, by zooming in on the importance of trade and roads.

ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN EASTERN DRC AND UGANDA

The economic links between Eastern DRC and Uganda (but also Rwanda) are extensive: Eastern DRC is economically much more interlinked with its neighbours to the East – Uganda and Rwanda – than with Kinshasa, which is much more distant (Titeca 2024). This means that Eastern DRC's imports primarily come from, or pass through, Uganda and Rwanda. For example, given that Eastern DRC does not have any industry to speak of, these are imported from (or through) its neighbours. This also means Eastern DRC's most important commodities are exported to its neighbours – Uganda and Rwanda - rather than to Kinshasa. Gold and coffee are two important examples of this dynamic.

Gold trade in Eastern DRC has historically happened outside of state control: gold supply chains are located largely outside of the state framework. The Lubero area is particularly important in the gold trade: a 2022 report estimated that 20% of artisanal mined gold produced in Eastern DRC is transiting through the Beni-Butembo-Kasindi corridor (Cristofaro et al. 2022). This amounts to 15 to 20 tons per year, with Uganda as the primary destination.


Coffee presents a similar picture. Lubero is responsible for the large bulk of coffee exports – 75% of all Congolese coffee exports originate from this area (Development Solutions & Élan RDC Specialty Crops 2021). This coffee is both exported informally (i.e. smuggled) and through formal exports.



This overall trade between Eastern DRC and Uganda is characterized by a mixture between formal and informal trade. As the coffee example shows, a ‘formal’ good can be traded both formally and informally. Commodities such as coffee can act as a cover for other goods, such as minerals, in order to smuggle the latter through formal border points (Salvaggio and Callari forthcoming: 23).

What both smuggled gold and coffee have in common is that, once they enter Uganda, they transform from an unrecorded commodity into an officially traded good, which then officially enters the global markets. Gold is particularly important to Uganda’s economy. Since 2016, it is Uganda’s most important export product,² and since then, it has been growing rapidly – in magnitudes which are the highest in the region, and significantly higher than Rwanda, something which is clearly shown in graph 1 below. In 2023, gold presented US\$2.7 billion in revenue, or 37% of Uganda’s export earnings (Nakaweesi 2024). Gold does not only enter Uganda informally; it also leaves the country in this way. A report from Uganda’s auditor-general for example showed how for financial year 2023-2024, no taxes were paid – leaving roughly 19 million USD (68,84 Bn UGX) in unpaid export levies (Kansiime 2025). In other words, while the Ugandan state is aware of these unpaid taxes, it still happens – illustrating how this trade is controlled by elite figures.

Graph 1: ‘Gold Exports as declared by DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi’



Source: UN Comtrade Database (code 7108), declared by Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and DRC. Summed over all trading partners.



INVOLVEMENT OF CONGOLESE TRADERS: THE NANDE TRADING COMMUNITY

To understand the organization of this trade, we also need to look at the Congolese traders which are involved. Ituri and the Grand Nord (consisting of Beni, Butembo and Lubero) are considered the key-zones of influence of Uganda, in which Uganda holds close relations with respectively the Hema and Nande traders.

Since the early 1960s, there has been a close trading relationship between the Nande traders in the DRC and Uganda (Salvaggio and Callari forthcoming). The Nande traders are de facto governing the Congolese side of the DRC-Ugandan borderlands, and have used their relations with armed groups and government actors (on both sides of the border) to protect their business interests. These interests to a large extent overlap with Uganda's economic interests. Concretely, there's an intensive trade between the Nande in the Grand Nord and Uganda, in which on the one hand commodities such as gold, coffee or cacao are exported, and on the other hand industrial or agricultural commodities are imported. These industrial commodities either originate directly from Uganda, or come from further away, such as Dubai – in which case they arrive in Mombasa and use the Northern corridor transport route (see Image 2 below). This dynamic is not limited to the Lubero, but also plays out in Ituri, where it is not Nande, but Hema holding close trading relations with Uganda.

All of these actors – Uganda and the Nande & Hema - will therefore look for ways to advance their economic interests. This was most visible during the two Congo wars in the nineties and early 2000s, in which Uganda had various and quickly shifting alliances in Eastern DRC, including with the Nande and Hema. These contacts and engagements did not stop after the end of the second Congo war in 2003, and largely focused on trade, security and infrastructure.

Most directly relevant are a series of meetings which started in the second half of the 2010s, and which all focused on security and trade.³ Key in these meetings, which all took place in Kampala, is that they brought together the Nande and Hema communities, together with Ugandan elites. In doing so, Ugandan wanted to both protect its border, and improve its trade with DRC; whereas the Nande and Hema wanted to improve trade and security. Insecurity along the Beni-Kasindi road was for example hindering the coffee and cacao trade, something all these parties hoped to improve through these collaborations.

Parallel to these negotiations, there equally were a range of negotiations and agreements on a macro level between the Tshisekedi and Museveni governments. These negotiations also aimed to improve trade and infrastructure between both countries – most significantly an agreement to enhance cross-border trade, as well as an agreement to construct key-road networks in Congo (Ebuteli 2022). As will be shown later, this agreement on roads is particularly important to understand the current operations of the Ugandan army in Eastern DRC.

All these trade and infrastructure negotiations and preparations gained speed after Operation Shujaa started in November 2021. In theory, the operation was targeting the ADF, but as we will see below, the constructions of roads also was an intrinsic part of this military operation.


THE FORMALIZATION OF THE NANDE-UGANDA RELATION THROUGH OPERATION SHUJAA

Importantly, before this operation was launched, President Tshisekedi asked explicit permission to the Nande community for the Ugandans to enter DRC. This event requires some more attention, as it shows the central role of the Nande community in all these dynamics.



On the 23rd of November 2021, Tshisekedi met with key-personalities from within the Nande community in Kinshasa – see the image below.⁴

Image 1: 'Meeting Nande Leaders – President Tshisekedi November 2021



Before, the Nande were very much cut off from decision-making in and by Kinshasa, and this consultation meant a turning point. Tshisekedi did so for two reasons. First, he feared losing control over the Nande region in North Kivu and therefore involved them for this decision. But it also has to be understood in relation with Mbusa Nyamwisi. The former rebel-turned-politician is generally described as a *'pompier-pyromane'*/'arsonist-firefighter' - creating political capital by stoking armed conflict in the Grand Nord region, to then solve it again to gain political power (Verweijen 2017). This both withheld Tshisekedi from giving him a high-level position, but also forced him to involve Nyamwisi and the Nande community in the decision to allow Ugandan troops in their region.

It was the disturbance of this equilibrium which ignited the current conflict, and more particularly Uganda's plan to construct roads in Eastern DRC (Ebuteli 2022). As part of Operation Shujaa, Uganda aimed to construct a set of roads, one of which was a road from Bunagana to Goma, for a total of 89kms - which was seen as directly entering the heart of Rwanda's zone of influence.⁵

The current conflict in Eastern DRC should thus be seen as a struggle for control over the regional trade between Uganda and Rwanda, and the roads associated with this trade. Concretely, Rwanda feared that the planned (Bunagana-Goma) road would take away too much revenue from Kigali. Central to trade in this region are the transcontinental Northern and Central corridors: the Northern corridor connects the port of Mombasa in Kenya with Eastern DRC through Uganda; whereas the Central corridor connects the port of Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania with Eastern DRC, through Rwanda (see image 2). Rwanda feared that, through the construction of the Bunagana-Goma road, much trade would shift to the Northern corridor – which has better infrastructure, and hence faster transport. In doing so, Rwanda would lose out economically, both in terms of taxes and trade. Indeed, in 2022, soon after the emergence of M23, the group captured the equipment of the road works while killing UPDF soldiers attempting to protect it (Bagala 2025). This meant the end of the Bunagana-Goma road works, which were seen as a direct threat by Rwanda. While the works on the Butembo-Beni-Kasindi road continued, they did face a number of challenges, which were attributed to taxation and a lack of a political will by the Congolese authorities. In October 2024, Uganda and DRC reached an agreement to intensify works – particularly for the Butembo-Beni-Kasindi road (Bagala 2024a). This road is the beating heart of the Nande trade(rs), connecting Congo and Uganda, and linking up Eastern DRC with the Northern Corridor. Also, the most recent renewal of the military agreement between Uganda and the DRC – signed on the 20th of June 2025 in Kinshasa – explicitly mentions the rehabilitation of the Butembo-Beni-Kasindi road as part of the Ugandan military operations.

It remains uncertain if the Bunagana-Goma road will materialize, as there are continued tensions between Rwanda and Uganda over the control of this regional trade. These tensions manifest themselves in a number of ways.

First, Ugandan traders are currently losing major revenue: they are no longer able to trade through the M23 controlled border posts – first Bunagana, then Ishasa, Buzana and Kyeshero. Instead, they have to go through Rwanda, making their goods and trade more expensive. Various Ugandan traders claim they are being met with resistance by the Rwanda authorities, which are making their trade more difficult.⁶ Overall, Ugandan traders complain about a loss of market in Eastern DRC. The Ugandan newspaper Daily Monitor summarized the situation as 'M23 rebels now eating Uganda's lunch in DR Congo' (Bagala and Awori 2025).

Second, it should be strongly emphasized how much of the Ugandan military actions are about controlling and protecting the roads in the Ugandan zone of influence. In the abovementioned 2019-2020 negotiations between Uganda and the DRC, three roads were identified as crucial in further fostering trade (Athumani 2019), and each of these roads are now central in Uganda's military operations in Eastern DRC. First, there are the Kasindi-Beni-Butembo, and Bunagana-Rutshuru-Goma roads. It has been shown before how Uganda's Operation Shujaa – Uganda's reason to enter DRC in November 2021 – was closely intertwined with works on both of these roads, and how the UPDF put much effort in protecting the road construction (Ebuteli 2022). This is still the case today: a significant number of UPDF camps are located along the Butembo-Beni-Kasindi road. Second, in the 2019-2020 negotiations, a third road was also mentioned: Goli-Mahagi-Bunia. And indeed, also in the UPDF's operations in Ituri, it is protecting the road and its trade (and mainly the Hema traders).⁷

By protecting these various roads, the Ugandan army makes sure to protect the trade flow at a number of levels. Locally, the UPDF presence makes sure to protect trade on the roads itself, benefiting the Nande and Hema elites – which, as shown

above had been lobbying for this. Regionally, Uganda protects and expands its control over the transcontinental trade in Central and Eastern Africa, through the Northern Corridor. But these actions also have advantages at a national level. According to the Ugandan ambassador to the DRC, Uganda made a \$53 million trade surplus with Congo last financial year, which was - again according to the ambassador - 'mainly facilitated' by Operation Shujaa (Musisi 2024). If we look at Mpondwe border point - the Ugandan border point in the Butembo-Beni-Kasindi corridor – we see a similar dynamic. Since the beginning of Operation Shujaa – and notwithstanding the escalation of the M23 conflict - the informal export through Mpondwe has gradually been growing: from 106,1 million USD in 2022 to 131,2 million USD in 2023 (UBOS 2025).

It is difficult to find data on the ways in which key-commodities such as timber or gold are exported from DRC to Uganda, given that this is mostly done informally. For gold, it is however interesting to note how in Uganda, there seems to have been a notable increase in conflicts around gold deals gone wrong over the last year and a half. A telling example is the following event: In July 2024, there was a shootout between soldiers over gold, in which 2 people were killed. The gold had been picked up in Mpondwe border point, on the orders of the UPDF attaché to the DRC, who had sent his driver to pick up the gold. This driver was a corporal of the Defence Intelligence and Security services (i.e. a military spy). They were to deliver it to the Ugandan honorary consul to Djibouti – owning a gold refinery in Uganda (Ankole Times 2024). Close to Kampala, they were raided by a car of 4 people in military uniforms. It led to a shooting, killing the driver of the assailant, and a bystander (Bagala and Nabukenya 2024). The killed driver was a soldier, which according to the army had deserted the army 2 months before (New Vision 2024). Another example was that in early July 2025, Colonel James Kasule, a former (section one) commander of Operation Shujaa, and a group of soldiers were arrested for trying to rob a gold dealer in Mubende district in Uganda (Asiimwe 2025).

These are just a few examples. The above is not to suggest that the Uganda's security services and/or the UPDF are engaged in a structural pillaging of natural resources, as they did in the second Congo war, and for which it was sentenced by the International Court of Justice. The UPDF has professionalized over the years, for example through its participation in peacekeeping missions (Titeca 2024b). But the above incidents suggest other things: First, the UPDF deployment is de facto protecting the long-established cross-border trading complex, most likely allowing for a bigger influx of gold in the country. Second, this also offers a range of opportunities for individual security personnel – of which the July 2024 incident is a particularly striking example. Third, and although this is beyond the scope of the paper, it is worth mentioning how over the last year, the UPDF (and important sections thereof) have had their formal and informal powers increased. This has led to a range of high-profile incidents in which soldiers were involved, such as attacks on police stations, or the de facto abduction of a police commander. The above incidents can be understood in the same vein.

UNDERSTANDING UPDF'S MILITARY EXPANSION

The above context also helps to understand the UPDF's expanding military footprint in Eastern DRC: it has to be understood as a protection of their zone of influence, in which their economic interests are key.

First, the UPDF's first expansion in late January and mid-February was a reaction to the M23's escalation of the conflict, through the takeover of Goma: there was an expectation that the M23/RDF would move northwards and take Beni and Butembo. By expanding first to these areas, the UPDF was protecting its zone of influence. The announcement of the UPDF's Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) that they would enter Kisangani has to be understood in the same vein: during this period, there were concerns and/or signals that M23 would take over Kisangani, which is part of the economic corridor which Uganda is protecting. During this period, Uganda's CDF also explicitly stated – on X – that Lubero was the border between the Ugandan and Rwandan zones of influence.⁸

Second, Uganda's actions have to be understood through their relations with the Nande traders. When, after the takeover of Goma, M23 was moving north, there was real concern among Nande elites that M23 was also coming to occupy their area, leading to a number of businessmen fleeing. As a result of this, Nande elites – and in particular Mbusa Nyamwisi and Bishop Melchisedech – intensified their contacts with Kampala, requesting them to intervene (Africa Intelligence 2025). The Nande have little faith in the Congolese army to protect them, and – as shown above – they see Uganda as their historical ally and protector. This also explains the April 2025 protests in Butembo when the UPDF announced its withdrawal (Wandera 2025) (which eventually did not materialize): the UPDF generally is welcomed by the population in the Grand Nord – it is seen to protect them and the economy.

ALSO, POLITICS IS IMPORTANT

Before we conclude, it is important to highlight why Uganda puts this much effort in protecting its economic relations with eastern DRC. All of this also holds major political importance for the Museveni government: a major fear for the latter is an 'Arab Spring scenario' in which the large youthful population – of which many are un- or under-employed – start protesting the regime (Titeca 2024). This first happened in 2011 during the 'Walk to Work protests' in Kampala, which were mainly provoked by the rising food prices. A stable economy is therefore crucial for the Museveni government, and the Eastern Congolese market is central to this: some call it the main lifeline for Uganda's economy. When President Museveni announced the plans to construct roads in Eastern DRC, he not only explicitly linked it to economic growth, but also to the prevention of political unrest: "when you produce, you supply goods, you supply services. But you also create jobs for the youth (...) in the absence of development, poverty sets in and becomes a vector of instability" (Athumani 2019).

This also explains the relatively high number of troops which are active in DRC. Various interlocutors estimate that around 10,000 troops are active in Eastern DRC, in a situation in which the UPDF's national and foreign deployments risks being overstretched: currently, the UPDF also has operations in Uganda's Karamoja region, South Sudan, as well as in Somalia (under the African Union Stabilization Mission).

Moreover, Uganda faces increasing budgetary difficulties. With a rapidly increasing government debt, the government increasingly has to rely on borrowing to finance its annual budget. For example, in late May 2025, the Uganda's Parliament approved a €500 million borrowing package to support the current 2024/25 budget (ending June 2025) (Samilu 2025).

WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS TELL US? AMBIGUOUS RELATIONS WITH KIGALI AND M23

On the one hand, the above shows a clear competition for influence between Uganda and M23 & Kigali, in which each side aims to protect its zone of influence. This manifested itself in what could be described as a staring contest between the UPDF and M23/RDF, in which the latter was testing the limits, by slowly pushing further in Southern Lubero – to see if there would be a reaction or not (see Map 2).

This also has to be understood within the historical animosity between Kigali and Kampala: despite the fact that Kagame and Museveni were brothers in arms in the 1980s, the relationship between Kigali and Kampala can at best be described as 'frenemies', in which Kigali continues to be seen as a continued threat to the Museveni government.

On the other hand, since the outbreak of the M23 conflict in November 2021, relations with Kigali have improved - largely under the impetus of the current CDF and son of the President Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who is particularly close to Kigali. Since December 2023, coordination meetings are held on a regular basis between the Ugandan and Rwandan military

officials (Amanya 2023) - the last one in March 2025 (Ministry of Defence Rwanda 2025). Moreover, the UN Group of experts' report (UN 2024) documented a certain degree of support to M23 – which was largely passive (such as allowing troops to pass over its territory). Various sources indicate that this posture has remained.

In this context many suggest a level of understanding, or even an agreement, between Uganda and M23 & Kigali. But, an agreement which only the 'frenemies' Kigali and Kampala are able to do, in which both parties test the limits of that agreement and flex their muscles – which explains the close contact of M23 and UPDF in Southern Lubero.

AMBIGUOUS RELATIONS WITH KINSHASA


All of this also suggests an ambiguous relation between Kampala and Kinshasa. On the one hand, Uganda is de facto expanding its control over Eastern DRC. On the other hand, Kampala does not want to jeopardize its relations with Kinshasa: it wants to keep a formal permission to stay within DRC through Operation Shujaa.

There are indeed a series of tensions between Kinshasa and Kampala. For example, Kinshasa refused to accredit the Ugandan ambassador to Kinshasa – posted in December 2021, shortly after the outbreak of the M23 conflict – in what was perceived as a 'deliberate snub' (Bagala 2024b) over the M23 question. It can be questioned if Kinshasa is in a position to refuse Ugandan demands, even though the UPDF argues it has the formal permission of Kinshasa to do so. As one analyst summarized: "At this moment, Tshisekedi cannot afford another problem on his list. He cannot do anything." Indeed, Kinshasa at this moment is not in a position to open up another – diplomatic or military – front against Kampala. Moreover, the conversations between the Nande elites and Uganda happened without a mandate from Kinshasa. All of this reflects a view shared by many Ugandan (and also Rwandan) elites: a belief that Kinshasa is unable to resolve the Congolese conflict, govern the area, and protect the Ugandan interests in the region. Both Uganda and Rwanda consider it in this context legitimate to take the rights in their own hands.

In recent times, there have been a range of initiatives to strengthen the relation with Kinshasa: Congolese deputy Prime Minister Vital Kamerhe visited Kampala twice over the last months. And, the Ugandan ambassador to the DRC was finally accredited in April 2025 (New Vision 2025). Most significantly, CDF Muhoozi Kainerugaba visited Kinshasa on the 20th of June 2025 to renew the Memorandum of Understanding on Operation Shujaa, and formalise the expanded zone of operation – a meeting in which they emphasized the 'amical relations' between both countries. However, and in almost classic Ugandan ambiguity, two days later, the CDF tweeted he would attack the Wazalendo 'wherever we would find them' – accusing them of killing 'our people'.⁹ In doing so, he directly threatened a key-ally of Kinshasa.

AMBIGUOUS RELATIONS WITHIN THE UPDF

Lastly, there also is a similar ambiguity within the UPDF on the M23 question. On the one hand, CDF Muhoozi Kainerugaba has been very explicit about his support of M23 and Kigali through a series of provocative tweets (Titeca 2024). On the other hand, this view is not shared by the whole UPDF, with historical animosities towards Rwanda still being present, particularly among the older generation of UPDF commanders. For example, in November 2022 Ugandan deputy CDF Peter Elwelu stated how 'we can defeat M23 in one day' (Bagala 2022). Most importantly, President Museveni wants to keep the position as the 'old wise man' overlooking the conflict – in which continued influence over Eastern DRC is key, as is a prevention of a further escalation of the conflict. Through these operations and its presence, Uganda also has an interest to avoid heavy fighting in this part of Eastern DRC – it wants to protect its oil installations across the border, as well as its tourism industry.¹⁰



It's clear that President Museveni holds the upper hand in this dossier. Moreover, the more M23 encroached on the Ugandan zone of influence, the more this vision became dominant. It however remains to be seen if Museveni will keep the upper hand in the foreseeable future. The CDF's room for manoeuvre has been increasing in the first half of 2025, with both his statements, as well the actions of his Special Forces Command becoming increasingly unchecked. It remains to be seen what this will mean for the M23 dossier; as well as for the overall Ugandan political settlement.

CONCLUSIONS

In this briefing, we set out to explain the actions of Uganda in the conflict of Eastern DRC. First of all, this has to be understood within the historical economic relations between Ugandan and Eastern DRC – which are important for Uganda's economy. President Museveni sees economic stability crucial for political stability; and Eastern DRC is a crucial element, if not a lifeline, for Uganda's economy – the gold export being the most prominent, but not the only element here. Similarly, Kampala sees – similar to Kigali – Kinshasa as unable to resolve the conflict, or protect their interests.

Second, in this context, Uganda – and particularly President Museveni – is playing a clearly tactical game, in which its main guiding principle is the protection of its interests, by keeping its 'zone of influence'. The protection of trade is particularly important here, which it mainly does through the protection (and construction) of roads. This is not only for the protection of the cross-border trade between the DRC and Uganda; it's also about the control over the transcontinental trade, through the Northern Corridor. In doing so, Uganda plays a particularly ambiguous role, which both is favourable and unfavourable to the other actors involved – be it Kigali, M23 or Kinshasa.



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Endnotes

- 1 In which 3 suicide attackers killed 3 bystanders, and dozens wounded.
- 2 Malo Rico and Zeng (2024) argue how the opening of the gold refinery of the Belgian Alain Goetz in Uganda was an important driver therein.
- 3 Key meetings where (i) August 2015 (meeting Hema-Nande leaders); (ii) meetings of Mbusa Nyamwisi throughout 2017; (iii) two meetings in late 2018.
- 4 In particular Mbusa Nyamwisi, the former rebel leader and government minister. Bishop Paluku Melchisedech, the head of the Catholic Dioceses in Butem, Julien Paluku, the government minister, and delegates from the Kayaganda Yira cultural association (see image 1).
- 5 This happened at a time of severe tensions between Rwanda and Uganda; and with Kigali feeling very much isolated in the region – with other neighbouring countries being able to intervene militarily in Eastern DRC.
- 6 Interviews Uganda traders, Kampala, May-June 2025.
- 7 Also, the FARDC is involved in protecting this road.
- 8 <https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1895538541683458395> and <https://x.com/KMSmedianetwork/status/1895673866778751038>
- 9 <https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1936863405907886425> and <https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1936891362340651436>
- 10 The tourism industry is economically and politically becoming increasingly important for Uganda; and a number of important tourist attractions (i.e. nature parks) are close to the Congolese border.





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