A Boomerang or a Turning Point for the EU in Central Africa?

In the week following the overtaking of Goma by the M23/Rwanda Defense Forces coalition, Kinshasa was rocked by riots targeting countries perceived as being  responsible for the escalating conflict in eastern Congo.

*****

A Boomerang or a Turning Point for the EU in Central Africa?

In the week following the overtaking of Goma by the M23/Rwanda Defense Forces coalition, Kinshasa was rocked by riots targeting countries perceived as being  responsible for the escalating conflict in eastern Congo. These riots were directed not only against the Embassy of Rwanda – which, together with the M23 rebels, is trying to de facto control huge parts of eastern Congo – but also against a number of Western embassies, such as those of the EU, Belgium and, in particular, France.

While these protests reflect larger anti-Western sentiments, in the case of the EU these were a direct consequence of a series of problematic EU decisions in recent years. In 2022 and 2024, for example, the EU signed an agreement with Rwanda to finance its army to the tune of €20 million each for a military operation in Mozambique. This came at a time when a series of UN reports had exposed the involvement of the Rwandan army in the war in Congo. This, of course, rightly led to much anger in Congo: how can you fund an army that is at the same time invading another country, committing one of the most fundamental violations of international law?

This was not the only problematic agreement. In February 2002, the EU and Rwanda signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) on initiatives in the field of ‘critical mineral resources’ – many of which, of course, come from Congo. This MoU was signed with great fanfare in Kigali. By the end of 2023, the EU had announced a €900 million investment in Rwanda as part of its ‘Global Gateway’ project in the areas of health, critical minerals, agri-food, climate change and education.

Europe First

These agreements must also be seen in the context of European foreign policy in recent years. Foreign policy has, of course, always had a degree of self-interest. In fact, the agreements with the Rwandan army can be seen as an old-fashioned ‘Francafrique’ deal: it was done mainly under pressure from France to secure TotalEnergies’ gas installations in Mozambique – an investment of some $20 billion.

But self-interest and the so-called ‘transactional’ element of European politics have become much more prominent since the war in Ukraine. That war served as a wake-up call for Europe, showing, particularly in Africa, that it was not as loved as it thought: African leaders did not necessarily take a ‘pro-Western’ stance in the war with Russia. Europe is therefore trying to adapt to this new geopolitical world order with new initiatives such as the ‘Global Gateway’, which focuses on infrastructure and explicitly aims to compete with China. Poverty reduction and aid to the poorest countries have been severely cut in recent EU budgets.  Certainly, the commodities agreement with Rwanda has to be understood in this ‘transactional context’, with the EU trying to put another finger on the pulse of a market that is already largely in the hands of China in Central Africa.

Another consequence of this changing context is that sanctions have become a less desirable tool, whether in the form of aid cuts or even crackdowns on human rights abuses.  In 2012/2013 – when the M23 first emerged – major donors (including the EU and a number of member states) were quick to impose sanctions. This time, none of that has happened, while M23 occupies a much larger territory. Why?

An opportunity, or the bankruptcy of EU policy in Central Africa?

The EU’s path of action with regard to the above agreements should be straightforward. First, he military agreements with Rwanda were negotiated with a clear condition, namely respect for international law, which has now been quite clearly violated. Second, also the raw materials agreement had an explicit condition: it had to include a traceability and transparency mechanism, which Rwanda seems unwilling to accept. The reason is obvious: most of these raw materials come from Congo. Yet the agreement has so far not been suspended, even if its implementation through the definition of a road map is currently halted. In response to concerns about this agreement last week, a European Commission spokesperson brushed aside any criticism, instead arguing it will increase traceability and transparency.

Information about the negotiations on sanctions against Rwanda at EU level suggests that France, which has been a key player in previous agreements, is obstructing the process, by refusing sanctions. It appears to be doing so in order to be able to bring Rwanda and the DRC to the negotiating table, a bizarre argument considering that in 2012-2013, negotiations only started after pressure was exerted and sanctions implemented against the invading country.

Belgium, on the other hand, has been taking the lead in pulling the sanctions cart – just as it was the main opponent of military aid to Rwanda. Moreover, diplomatic relations between Belgium and Rwanda are currently at low ebb as Belgium refused in 2023 to accredit a Rwandan Ambassador over the latter’s past complicity in persecution of opponents. Rwanda refused until today to present a replacement.

It is undoubtedly true that the weakness of DRC’s Tshisekedi is an advantage for Rwanda’s Kagame: the former’s inconsistent, erratic and unrealistic management of the M23 crisis since the beginning has not been particularly helpful, and has been a major source of frustration for the regional and international community. However, this cannot be an excuse for the EU to not fundamentally condone – through sanctions – the Rwandan invasion and de facto annexation.

It is one thing for the EU to seek a new place in a new geopolitical world order, but its credibility in Central Africa – and in Congo in particular – is being severely tested. ‘Europe First’ therefore seems to have a boomerang effect: it is not far-fetched to imagine that, as in West Africa, we will soon end up with rabidly anti-Western governments. A first and important step in restoring this legitimacy – and above all in helping to end the war – would be a very clear EU stance on Rwanda, including sanctions against the regime.

Hopefully, the EU under the new Commission seems to become aware of this problem. There is mounting pressure from other member states to take a stronger position towards the occupation of parts of East-Congo by Rwanda. The 24 January 2025 statement of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy directly blames Rwanda – something unthinkable under the previous High Representative.

The EU can only regain its credibility and influence by sticking to its founding charter, and by adapting its positioning and communication to the complex realities and sensibilities on the ground. Self-interest can also be pursued without putting all its eggs in the Rwandan basket which guarantees its own stability by trying to control economically and militarily East-DRC.

Kristof Titeca (Professor, University of Antwerp and Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute); Erik Kennes (Senior Researcher, Egmont Institute).

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)