The prospect of Europe having to deter Russia without dependable US backing has moved from theoretical to plausible, reigniting a long-standing debate: can Europe credibly deter Russia on its own and, if so, what will it take? NATO thinking on escalation management has long rested on the assumption that deterrence requires credible nuclear escalation options. This assumption remains largely untested, and changing circumstances make it pressing to revisit. Against this backdrop, Linde’s research asks whether nuclear-centric thinking best serves Europe’s needs in scenarios short of a full-scale nuclear exchange. In such contingencies, nuclear threats can prove difficult to make credible and carry considerable political, operational and strategic risks.

Her research explores an alternative based on substitution: conventional denial, complemented by advanced long-range precision-strike capabilities, as the primary means of managing escalation. Existing national nuclear arsenals, held in a minimum deterrence posture, would remain a residual hedge against worst-case scenarios. Such an approach may strengthen deterrence, support more equitable burden-sharing within NATO, and reduce incentives for proliferation.

Linde’s research examines nuclear politics and alliance politics, particularly in the European context. Prior to joining Leiden, she held fellowships at the MIT Security Studies Program and Columbia University. She holds a PhD from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, where her dissertation earned the 2022 Global Strategy PhD Prize.

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