2025: Is Europe Ready for the Old Normal?

A newly-elected President of the United States who lays claim to Canada, Greenland, and Panama, is far from normal. For Europeans, it is the last thing they expected from their powerful ally, supposed to be a bulwark of the international order.

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2025: Is Europe Ready for the Old Normal?

A newly-elected President of the United States who lays claim to Canada, Greenland, and Panama, is far from normal. For Europeans, it is the last thing they expected from their powerful ally, supposed to be a bulwark of the international order. For Putin, on the other hand, it must provide some enjoyable relief from the carnage in Ukraine. Perhaps Trump’s lack of inhibitions may help Europe understand that, seen in a historic light, such naked greed is only too “normal” behaviour for a great power.

Decline or fall ?

Three thousand years of international politics is a history of powers alternately competing and cooperating to obtain raw materials, trade, and influence. All too often, powers chose the path of rivalry and, ultimately, war to still their ambition. That is the multipolar strategic environment so neatly encapsulated by Lord Palmerston in his famous dictum: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (1848).

It was ever thus, and still is, but Western Europeans can be excused (up to a point) for having forgotten. Eighty years of peace among them, from 1945 to 2025, is the truly great achievement of European integration – and an amazing exception in their history. Seventy-six years of the NATO alliance with the US, since 1949, is historically exceptional too. Unfortunately, it led many to think that the world around them had given up on power politics too, which of course it never did.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, now a candidate for EU membership, the fraying strategic consensus between EU Member States as their domestic politics become more polarised, and the erratic pronouncements of the US president should make us realise that neither our own unity nor our security from external threats is ever permanently acquired. This is not a new world order – this is the “old normal” that forces itself upon Europe’s attention again.

Historically speaking, great powers rise and fall, and alliances come and go. That is not a call for fatalism, however. The decline of the Roman Empire lasted longer than the entire life of many other polities; the EU and NATO too are not done just yet. And Europe does not have to decline, certainly not in absolute terms. This is a call to action, therefore.

European Strategy

First and foremost, Europe must finally decide who it is: a great power in its own right, a pole of the multipolar world, that defends its own interests. Europe’s ambition cannot merely be to be the most loyal ally of the US. Only strong powers can conclude advantageous alliances, for they are allies worth having; weak players pay the price for their dependence and end up as protectorates. Trump ought to remember from his first term that it is much easier, indeed, to bully one’s friends than to coerce one’s rivals. A strong Europe will not be bullied into deals it does not want. Tough negotiations will secure an equitable alliance instead.

No great overhaul of strategy is required to achieve this; the EU and the Member States need only continue along the lines set out by the first von der Leyen Commission – but much further and faster. Five priorities stand out:

(1) Strengthening Europe’s geoeconomic position by setting an ambitious industrial policy, investing in technology, and de-risking vis-à-vis other powers. (2) Securing Europe’s vulnerable geopolitical position by taking the lead in stabilising the “zone of responsibility” around it, from Ukraine, through the Caucasus, to the Middle East and North Africa. (3) Combining geoeconomics and geopolitics and establish a positive presence in key third countries by investing in them via the Global Gateway. (4) Assuring the defence of Europe itself by building a complete European pillar in NATO and a strong defence industry in the EU. (5) Build coalitions with states, democratic or otherwise, that want to invest in universal multilateral institutions.

European Realpolitik 

What this amounts to, is Realpolitik: the realisation, not that the end justifies the means, but that every end, no matter how lofty, requires means. What this European Realpolitik should bring us, is the freedom to make our own choices. In other words (yes, I dare say it): strategic autonomy.

In the economic and diplomatic realm Europe certainly has to be able to decide for itself, notably vis-à-vis China. Unfortunately, China’s stance in recent years has eroded Europe’s trust in the possibility of true cooperation, but neither should Europe meekly follow a US policy that it judges too confrontational.

In the field of defence, Europe ought to be able to continue to support Ukraine, and ensure its survival and entry into the EU, even if the US would scale down or end its support. Europe ought not to have to fear a Russia that re-builds its forces after an eventual arrangement to end the war. Its deterrence and defence ought to be stronger, in fact, by the inclusion of Ukraine. Russia must be made to understand that any aggression in the Baltics, for example, would be met not only by a counterstrike there, but by an immediate offensive on the Ukrainian front as well.

Ultimately, a real European pillar in NATO, i.e. acquiring those military capabilities that until now only the US furbished, thus building a complete set of European forces, would provide at least some insurance against the worst-case scenario of the US abandoning NATO. The aim ought to be to keep NATO going, and maintain the defence planning process and the command structure, without the Americans.

All of this may seem fantastical to some. But a large-scale war on the European continent, or a US President not ruling out the use of the military instrument to acquire EU-territory, were inconceivable as well. Perhaps the EU as a whole is too divided already to act decisively; but a coalition of European states, including indeed key non-EU members such as the United Kingdom, can definitely act, and assume a leadership role, in concert with the leaders of the EU institutions.

I am not advocating for Europe to go it alone; I am urging it to be strong enough to be a true ally to its friends, and a real force against its rivals.

Sven Biscop spent the winter holiday reading about the history of great power politics, strategy, and war; and eating and drinking well. Blessed are the ignorant who do not read; those who do, know how to enjoy every good meal.

This article was first published in Dutch in the Knack.

(Photo credit:  Wikimedia Commons)